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I. INTRODUCTION
In contemporary American society, public law touches nearly every
aspect of the average citizen's life.1 When modern regulation and liti-
gation intersect with religious life, both constitutional and common
law issues arise.2 These issues arise in a broad range of contexts, in-
cluding the recent civil actions against clergy3 for breach of fiduciary
care, 4 clergy "malpractice,"' 5 and the regulation of the employment
practices of religious institutions. 6 A particularly difficult problem is
presented when states mandate clergy to report suspected cases of
elder abuse and neglect to public authorities for treatment and/or
prosecution.7 While clergy generally believe that information they re-
1. "[I]n the modern regulatory state, most activities and institutions are pervasively regu-
lated." Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 841, 848 (1992).
2. Justice Kennedy has noted that the "modern regulatory state" imposes a "substantial bur-
den on a large class of individuals," including religious adherents. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 535 (1997). Douglas Laycock has argued that religious conduct, along with most activi-
ties and institutions, will be pervasively regulated in the modern regulatory state, unless specific
exemptions are provided. "[R]eligious exercise is not free when it is pervasively regulated."
Laycock, supra note 1, at 848.
3. In this article, the terms "clergy," "clergyperson," "minister," or similar words are used
interchangeably and refer generally to any person who is ordained, serves in, and/or oversees a
religious community. These terms are not intended to be technical designations but rather en-
compass such titles or positions as imam, minister, pastor, priest, rabbi, and other religious offi-
cials/leaders. No denominational differentiation is meant by these terms unless specifically
stated. The occasional use of the masculine gender (i.e., clergyman) is only for convenience and
syntax, as many statutes use that gender. While these terms are initially defined by the religious
communities that employ them, secular considerations, including the requirements of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and the Social Security system, also factor into the definition of these terms.
See DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 293 (Daniel G. Reid et al. eds., 1990).
4. See Lisa Miller, Religion: Surge in Malpractice Suits Leads Pastors to Offer Less Counseling
to Parishioners, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1998, at B1 (describing the clergy's refusal to counsel parish-
ioners because of their fear of malpractice lawsuits).
5. In one recent case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal jury award to each
plaintiff of $115,000, including $30,000 in compensatory damages and $85,000 in punitive dam-
ages, in a suit brought by two women against their pastor for counseling malpractice. See Sand-
ers v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998), affd. 929 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Tex.
1996). See also Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
6. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (indicating that although the Civil Rights Act prohibit-
ing racial discrimination in employment applies to religious employers, these employers are ex-
empted from discrimination claims when they hire employees to carry out their religious
missions).
7. See infra Part III.C.
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ceive is confidential and therefore exempt from reporting require-
ments, this view oversimplifies and overgeneralizes a complex set of
intersecting religious, legal, and policy issues.
The importance of these issues is magnified by three interrelated
American phenomena. First, elder abuse and neglect is currently an
epidemic, affecting every community in the country. Mistreatment of
the aged is often associated with physical abuse but may take other,
less dramatic forms-psychological or emotional abuse, financial ex-
ploitation, and neglect of care-taking obligations. Both congressional
committees8 and academic researchers have estimated that between
one and two million cases occur each year in domestic settings alone.9
The magnitude of the epidemic becomes even clearer when one con-
siders that these numbers exclude what may be occurring in institu-
tions, such as nursing homes, hospitals, assisted-living facilities, or
other group homes.
Second, the most significant demographic trend of this century is
the exponential increase in the percentage of elderly persons compris-
ing the total United States population.' 0 Between 1900 and 1987, per-
sons aged 65 and older more than doubled as a proportion of the total
population and will nearly double again between 1987 and 2030.11 If
these trends continue, by 2000, persons aged 65 and over will comprise
13% of the population, and by 2030, this will rise to 21.8%. 12
Third, 80% of the aged are members of churches or other religious
bodies, and 56% of seniors attend church weekly. 13 The proportion of
the aged involved with religious institutions, paired with the statistics
of elderly mistreatment in the community, creates disturbing ques-
tions because the Judeo-Christian canon and tradition express deep
8. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG., ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A
HIDDEN PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT] (esti-
mating one million cases of abuse). A decade later, a follow-up congressional panel reported the
situation had worsened. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH LONG-TERM CARE, 101ST. CONG.,
ELDER ABUSE: A DECADE OF SHAME AND INACTION XI (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter 1990
ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT] (estimating more than 1.5 million persons may be victims of
such abuse each year, and the number is rising).
9. Karl A. Pillemer & David Finkelhor, The Prevalence of Elder Abuse: A Random Sample
Survey, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 51-57 (1988) (estimating 700,000 - 1,100,000 cases of elder mistreat-
ment, excluding financial exploitation, more than a decade ago).
10. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 101ST CONG., AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND
PROJECTIONS (ANNOTATED) (Comm. Print 1990).
11. Id. at 1-4.
12. Id. at 3.
13. GEORGE H. GALLUP, JR., RELIGION IN AMERICA 5, 40-41 (1996).
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
concern for the weak and elderly, 14 particularly parents and family
members. 15
The public first became aware of the complex issues created by
mandatory reporting statutes 16 following the prosecution of several
clergy and religious workers for failure to report child abuse. 17 Also,
many jurisdictions now require clergy to report elder mistreatment.
Yet these mandated affirmative duties often conflict with the clergy's
sacred obligations. A large body of theological literature and a
number of denominations require secrecy and confidentiality for some
information revealed to clergy. 18 Typically, these reporting laws, as
neutral laws of general applicability, are not intended to place a bur-
den on religion. 19 Their disregard for the unique qualities of religious
traditions and communities, however, often produces this result.20
This fundamental conflict is rarely discussed in the legal literature. 2'
When the government imposes an obligation on clergy to report in-
formation obtained in the course of their religious roles, religious
communities and traditions are affected in important ways.
14. See Isaiah 1:16-17; Isaiah 61:1-3; Amos 8:4-10; Leviticus 19:32 (requiring respect for the
elderly bordering on reverence); Acts 6:1; James 1:27 (containing clear illustrations of the respect
and care Christians are supposed to offer the elderly, especially widows and family members); 1
Timothy 5:3-16 (placing older persons and widows as role models to younger members of the
community).
15. See Exodus 20:2 (commanding honor for parents).
16. Mandatory reporting requirements refer to state statutes that require clergy and others to
report abuse in certain cases. For a discussion of mandatory reporting requirements, see infra
Part III.C.
17. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990); State v. Motherwell,
788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990) (en banc); Mellish v. State, No. 84-1930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. Eugene Gressman and Angela Carmella have noted the following regarding the inadver-
tent, yet real, burdens that the modern regulatory state places on religion.
In the free exercise area, there is no comparable linkage between intentional discrimi-
nation and resulting discrimination (as there is in the case of race and voting rights).
Typically, a burden on religious conduct that results from a neutral, generally applica-
ble law is attributable merely to the enforcement of that law, and not to efforts to
destroy or suppress some religious practice via general legislation. We certainly have
historical instances of this, but in the modern regulatory state most burdens are truly
"inadvertent."
Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 114 (1996) (footnote omitted).
20. Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First
Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 2, 3 (1986).
21. Several articles discuss clergy-parishioner communications, as well as the related free ex-
ercise and privileged communications issues, in the very different context of child abuse report-
ing statutes. See William A. Cole, Religious Confidentiality and the Reporting of Child Abuse: A
Statutory and Constitutional Analysis, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1987); Alexander D. Hill
& Chi-Dooh Li, A Current Church-State Battleground: Requiring Clergy to Report Child Abuse,
32 J. CHURCH & ST. 795 (1990).
WHEN SILENCE RESOUNDS
Mandatory reporting requirements raise a number of issues: the
scope and nature of the affirmative duty placed on clergy; the legiti-
macy of such governmental mandates; appropriate clergy conduct (le-
gally, morally, and professionally) in the face of conflict between
sacred and secular duties; and the appropriate protection or punish-
ment for "disobedient" clergy. Reporting requirements do not in-
volve a simple conflict between sacred and secular duties. On the one
hand, these issues involve government efforts in an area of legitimate
public concern-elder abuse and neglect. On the other, they have
deep roots in Western theological and legal traditions. Clergy and
their religious communities understand clergy-parishioner communi-
cations and confidentiality within the context of their respective sa-
cred traditions and practices. In fact these expectations shape clergy
conduct and parishioner expectations.
The minister's silence may allow an offender to evade legal respon-
sibility for abusive conduct. The victim, moreover, needs the protec-
tion provided by both religious and legal institutions. Justice may be
denied if the situation does not change. When an offender escapes
legal responsibility by hiding behind a "cleric's robe," and mistreat-
ment of the aged continues, the surrounding community is affected.
Furthermore, reporting requirements raise concerns regarding sound
public policy and constitutional rights. Clergy who report elder abuse
face risks including disclosure and hostility, the accusation of causing
"unfair charges," loss of trust and credibility, and breach of religious
discipline. Those who do not report also face risks such as criminal
penalties and civil damages; indeed, the religious institution itself
could be liable through vicarious liability. Thus, resolving these issues
has far-reaching implications.
In the first part of this article, clergy-parishioner communications
are examined in the context of religious traditions and ministerial/pro-
fessional ethics. 22 Second, this article considers the phenomenon of
elder abuse and neglect, together with statutory protections for the
aged and the almost uniform duty to report suspected elder mistreat-
ment. 23 The third part of this article analyzes potential criminal and
civil liabilities of clergy and their institutions when reporting laws are
ignored, violated, or disobeyed. 24 Last, legal protections available to
clergy are discussed, including the clergy-penitent privilege, federal
and state constitutions and statutes, and a proposed affirmative de-
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
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fense to negligence liability.25 Clergy must clearly understand their
sacred and secular obligations and the legal issues involved in this in-
creasingly important area, but public officials should also understand
the burdens that these statutes place upon clergy and the conflicts that
arise.
II. CLERGY-PARISHIONER COMMUNICATIONS
In order to evaluate the complex issues posed by applying
mandatory reporting requirements to clergy, it is necessary to under-
stand the nature of clergy-parishioner communications. This Part
surveys clergy-parishioner communications as viewed by several reli-
gious traditions and by common law. Next, ministerial and profes-
sional considerations of ethics and professional confidentiality are
examined.
A. Clergy-Parishioner Communications in Various
Religious Traditions
While clergy-parishioner communications are viewed differently by
various religious denominations, nearly all traditions have carefully
guarded these communications.2 6 However, the extent to which these
religious traditions have required confidentiality and secrecy varies.
Some forbid disclosure because certain clergy-parishioner communi-
cations are regarded as sacred, and in these traditions, violators of
confidential communications are punished for abrogation of this sa-
cred trust.27 Other religious traditions are more flexible-or at least
less punitive-regarding violations of confidentiality. 28 Since it is im-
possible to analyze clergy-parishioner communications in every reli-
gious tradition, we survey here only the teachings of a few prominent
religious traditions in America.
1. The Roman Catholic Church
The Roman Catholic Church has the most explicit and formal re-
quirements for maintaining the secrecy of clergy-parishioner commu-
nications.2 9 Papal decrees and official writings have forbidden
disclosure since the early history of the Church. In the middle of the
25. See infra Part V.
26. See JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE RIGHT To SILENCE: PRIVILEGED
CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW (1989).
27. See infra Part II.A.1.
28. See infra Part II.A.2.d. and accompanying text.
29. Perhaps it is because the Roman Catholic Church has been so explicit and formalist in its
teachings and requirements regarding clergy-parishioner communications that most American
legal analysis focuses extensively on clergy-parishioner communications in the Roman Catholic
tradition. See Julie Ann Sippel, Comment, Priest-Penitent Privilege Statutes: Dual Protection in
[Vol. 49:1
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fifth century, Pope Leo I, the bishop of Rome, discontinued the re-
quirement of public confession.30 In its place, he instituted the private
confession of sins (the Sacrament of Penance) 31 and charged priests to
keep secret what they heard in private confession.32 The Sacrament of
Penance is a religious rite whereby a penitent sincerely confesses per-
sonal sin to a priest, resolves to reform, obtains God's forgiveness, and
reconciles with the Church.33 By the ninth century, the Church had
announced that priests who violated the Seal of Confession 34 would
be liable for a double punishment: removal from priestly office and
lifelong exile. 35 The absolute obligation of silence applies not only to
the clergy, but also to interpreters, bystanders, eavesdroppers, persons
finding and reading lists of sins that are obviously created for the pur-
pose of confession, and everyone else except the penitent.36 The obli-
the Confessional, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1127 (1994); Michael Clay Smith, The Pastor on the Wit-
ness Stand: Toward a Religious Privilege in the Courts, 29 CATH. LAW. 1 (1984).
30. In bringing public confessions to an end, Pope Leo I said:
Although one must praise that plenitude of faith which, through fear of God does not
shrink from blushing before men, yet since the sins of all those who seek penance are
not of such a nature that they do not fear to have them published abroad, it is necessary
to desist from [the public reading of confessions], lest many be put off from availing
themselves of the remedies of penance.
GAYLORD B. NOYCE, PASTORAL ETHICS: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CLERGY 93
(1988).
31. According to St. Augustine, a sacrament is a "visible word" or an "outward and visible
sign of an inward and spiritual grace." OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 1218
(F. L. Cross & E. A. Livingstone eds., rev, 2d ed. 1983). According to Thomas Aquinas, a sacra-
ment is "the sign of a sacred thing in so far as it sanctifies men." Id. Roman Catholicism teaches
that the seven rites of Baptism, the Eucharist, Confirmation, Penance, Extreme Unction, Holy
Orders, and Matrimony convey grace in themselves. Id.
32. In a letter to the bishops at Campania, Samnium, and Picenum, Pope Leo I wrote:
[Cloncerning the penitence which is demanded by the faithful, one must not read pub-
licly the notes of a written confession on the nature of each individual sin, since it
suffices that the state of conscience be indicated in secret confession to the priests alone
.... Moreover, that confession is sufficient which is made firstly to God, and then also
to the priest, who prays for the sins of the penitents. Only then will they allow them-
selves to be summoned to penance, if the conscience of him who is confessing is not to
be revealed to the ears of the people.
MAX THURIAN, CONFESSION 61-62 (1958) (citing MIGNE, 54 PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLETUS
(1846)). This is the first record of a pope clearly demanding only secret confession and strict
silence on the part of the confessor. BERTRAND KURTSCHEID, A HISTORY OF THE SEAL OF
CONFESSION 51-55 (1927).
33. 1985 CODE c.959.
34. The Seal of Confession refers to "the absolute obligation not to reveal anything said by a
penitent using the Sacrament of Penance." OXFORD DICrIONARY, supra note 31, at 1254.
35. KURTSCHEID, supra note 32, at 87. Like the Roman Catholic Church in the West, the
Eastern Church has a long tradition of protecting clergy-parishioner communications. Id. at 56.
The Second Synod of Dwin issued a decree in A.D. 554 that warned that "[a] priest who reveals
the confession of the penitents shall be deposed with anathema." NOYCE, supra note 30, at 93.
36. See OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 1254.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
gation is rooted in a tacit contract between the penitent and the priest,
and protects the integrity of the use of the sacrament by the faithful.
Canon Law later formalized these requirements. 37 Canon 983, § 1
provides: "The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime
for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any other
manner or for any reason. '38 A priest could not reveal to a third party
any information gained from the communication, "even if every dan-
ger of revelation is excluded. '39 Under Canon Law, a violation of the
Seal of Confession carried the stiffest punishment: the priest was auto-
matically excommunicated from the church, deposed from the priestly
office, and sent into the confinement of a monastery to do perpetual
penance.40 Today, 1,600 years after Pope Leo I's declaration, these
doctrines regarding the Sacrament of Penance and the Seal of Confes-
sion remain inviolate.41
Thus, the Roman Catholic tradition, including Canon Law, has a
clearly established protocol regarding clergy-parishioner communica-
tions and the confidentiality of private confession: the priest must
maintain absolute secrecy, 42 without exception, whether the act be sin-
ful, criminal, or otherwise.4 3 The priest must obey the religious law
regardless of civil law requirements or the parishioner's desires. 44
Thus, for Roman Catholic clergy, statutorily mandated reporting re-
quirements create an irreconcilable conflict. In certain instances, fol-
lowing their sacred tradition risks secular legal punishment.45
37. See id.
38. 1985 CODE c.691.
39. "Even if every danger of revelation is excluded, a confessor is absolutely forbidden to use
knowledge acquired from confession when it might harm the penitent." 1985 CODE c.984, § 1.
Section 2 of this canon reads: "[O]ne who is placed in authority can in no way use for external
governance knowledge about sins which he has received in confession at any time." Id. at § 2.
40. Canon 1388 § 1 reads: "A confessor who directly violates the seal of confession incurs an
automatic excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See; if he does so only indirectly, he is to
be punished in accord with the seriousness of the offense." 1985 CODE c.1388, § 1. Canon 927
notes that the offense is one of only five that are reserved to the Holy See. Canon 21 of the
Fourth Lateran Council (1215) provided the following instruction regarding the mandated se-
crecy: "For whoever shall dare to reveal a sin disclosed to him in the tribunal of penance we
decree that he shall be not only deposed from the priestly office but that he shall also be sent
into the confinement of a monastery to do perpetual penance." Richard S. Nolan, The Law of
the Seal of Confession, 13 CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA 649 (1912).
41. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 46.
42. The Right of Penance states the following about the confessor's religious and moral obli-
gation: "Conscious that he has come to know the secret of another's conscience only because he
is God's minister, the confessor is bound by the obligation of preserving the seal of confession
absolutely unbroken." Right of Penance 10d.
43. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 28.
44. Id.
45. Id.
[Vol. 49:1
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2. Various Protestant Denominations
The Protestant traditions interpret clergy-parishioner communica-
tions differently than Catholicism, focusing not on the sacrament but
on the need for repentance.46 However, these traditions emphasize
the value of discipline within their churches and the need for private
counsel for those with troubled consciences. 47 Unlike the Roman
Catholic Church and its Canon Law, Protestant traditions do not man-
date consistent treatment of clergy-parishioner communications. 48 As
a result, the religious value assigned to confidentiality in particular
Protestant traditions is not easily summarized. This problem is com-
plicated by the multitude of denominations within Protestantism. 49
Thus, we survey several prominent Protestant traditions in America,
illustrating their differences as well as their common concerns regard-
ing confidential communications between clergy and parishioners.
a. Lutheran Churches
Penance is practiced differently in Lutheranism than in traditional
Catholicism.50 In his reforming work, Martin Luther broke with Cath-
46. See GEORGE WILLIAM BOWMAN, III, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFESSION (1969); THEODORE
W. JENNINGS, JR., THE LITURGY OF LIBERATION: THE CONFESSION AND FORGIVENESS OF SINS
(1988); JOHN T. McNEILL, A HISTORY OF THE CURE OF SOULS (1965); THURIAN, supra note 32,
at 61-62.
47. See EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY 834-35 (Walter A. Elwell ed., 1984).
48. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 42-46, 55-84.
49. "Protestant" is used here to signify "mainline" American religious groups such as Baptists,
Congregationalists, Disciples, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, and Presbyterians. See DIC-
TIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 3, at 700-01, 949. However, the title would also apply to
scores of other descendants of the Protestant Reformation such as Pentacostals, various Evan-
gelical and Fundamentalist groups in the Free Church tradition, and other independent groups.
See id. at 949; see also EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 888-91. The Baptists clearly
illustrate the complexity of the situation. In twentieth century America, Baptists are found in a
wide variety of associations, conventions, and fellowships: the American Baptist Association,
the American Baptist Convention, the Baptist Bible Fellowship, the Baptist General Confer-
ence, the Conservative Baptist Association of America, the General Association of Regular
Baptist Churches, the General Association of Separatist Baptists, the General Conference of
Seventh Day Baptists, the National Association of Free Will Baptists, the National Baptist Con-
vention of America, the National Baptist Convention of the U.S.A., Inc., the National Baptist
Evangelical Life and Soul-Saving Assembly, the North American Baptist Conference, the Primi-
tive Baptists, the Progressive Baptist Convention, the Southern Baptist Convention, and many
other organizations and independent Baptist groups and churches. See DICTIONARY OF CHRISTI-
ANITY, supra note 3, at 110-13; see also H. LEON McBETH, THE BAPTIST HERITAGE: FOUR
CENTURIES OF BAPTIST WrTEss 563-790 (1986).
50. The Lutheran tradition has its roots in the Lutheran part of the Protestant Reformation of
the sixteenth century. OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 849. In America, the vast major-
ity of Lutherans are members of three bodies: the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, and the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod. DICTION-
ARY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 3, at 670. For an overview of American Lutheranism, see id.
at 670-75.
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olic doctrine. For him, confession was not compulsory, but rather a
spiritual act in which Christians could participate when moved to do
so, not when required by church calendar. 51 While instructing on the
doctrine of confession, Luther wrote: "Confession should be brief, and
should be a confession chiefly of those things which cause pain at the
time of confession, and, as they say, move to confession. For the sac-
rament of confession was instituted for the quieting, not for the dis-
turbing, of the conscience. '52 Building on one of his central
theological themes-the priesthood of all believers53-Luther taught
that a Christian could confess open and hidden sins to any other
Christian, not just to a priest, and thus obtain absolution.54
Another important Lutheran theological theme is that of the two
kingdoms-the relationship between the church and state.5 5 Accord-
ing to Luther, God has established two kingdoms: one under the law,
and one under the gospel.56 The state exists to hold back chaos and
destruction, and operates under law, setting limits to human sin and its
consequences. Believers, on the other hand, belong to a second king-
dom, a kingdom in which civil authorities have no power. 57 Because
believers are simultaneously saints and sinners, they are under the au-
thority of the state.58 Regarding confession, Luther was convinced
that Christians should not reveal the contents of a confession in a
court of law.
Within the church's sphere of authority we deal in secret with the
conscience and do not take its jurisdiction from the civil estate.
Therefore people should leave us undisturbed in our sphere of au-
thority and should not drag into their jurisdiction what we do in
secret. I, too, have given secret advice, and because the matter was
secret, the advice was justly given in this way. If the affair comes
under the jurisdiction of civil authority later on, we know nothing of
it. Nor shall they drag us into the case.59
For Luther, this secrecy was to be maintained even if the confession
involved a serious or heinous crime.
[O]ne must distinguish between the authority of the church and the
authority of the state. The [sinner] did not confess to me but to
Christ. But what Christ keeps secret I, too, must keep secret and
51. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 63.
52. MARTIN LUTHER, DISCUSSION OF CONFESSION, 1 WORKS OF MARTIN LUTHER 89 (1943).
53. TIMOTHY GEORGE, THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMERS 95-98 (1988).
54. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 64.
55. See GEORGE, supra note 53, at 98-102.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 100-01.
58. Id. at 71-72, 100-01.
59. EWALD M. PLASS, 1 WHAT LUTHER SAYS 333 (1959).
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simply deny that I have heard anything. If Christ has heard any-
thing, He may Himself say so. But during the absolution I should
privately say to the [sinner]: You [sinner], never do that again.60
According to Luther, the Seal of Confession was inviolate.
Lutheran churches have continued this tradition, affording consid-
erable protection to clergy-parishioner communications. Lutheran
churches appear to require confession, although not enumeration of
every specific sin.61 In his American Lutheran Pastoral Theology, Carl
Ferdinand Wilhelm Walther, the principal founder of the Lutheran
Church, Missouri Synod, endorsed private confession and absolution,
and defended the Seal of Confession.62 At its twenty-second Biennial
Convention, the United Lutheran Church of America declared:
In keeping with the historic discipline and practice of the Lu-
theran Church and to be true to a sacred trust inherent in the nature
of the pastoral office, no minister of The United Lutheran Church
in America shall divulge any confidential disclosure given to him in
the course of his care of souls or otherwise in his professional capac-
ity, except with the express permission of the person who has con-
fided in him or in order to prevent the commission of a crime.
63
In 1960, the Church Council of the American Lutheran Church for-
mally adopted the policy that ministers may not divulge any confiden-
tial communication absent consent or the need to prevent the
commission of a crime.64
60. Id.
61. The Eleventh article of the Augsburg Confession states: "Of confession, they teach, that
Private Absolution ought to be retained in the churches, although in confession an enumeration
of all sins is not necessary. For it is impossible according to the Psalm: 'Who can understand his
errors?' (Psalm 19:12)." JUERGEN LUDWIG NEVE, THE AUGSBURG CONFESSION 10 (1914).
62. See JOHN T. McNEILL, A HISTORY OF THE CURE OF SOULS 188 (1951) (citing CARL F.W.
WALTHER, AMERICAN LUTHERAN PASTORAL THEOLOGY (1872)).
63. THE UNITED LUTHERAN CHURCH, MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-SECOND BIENNIAL CON-
VENTION OF THE UNITED LUTHERAN CHURCH OF AMERICA 277, 758 (1960).
64. The policy reads:
WHEREAS it has long been recognized that a part of the ministry of pastors of the
Lutheran church is to hear confessions, to counsel with persons, and to give advice,
comfort, and guidance to those who seek it; and
WHEREAS it is imperative that, in order for such ministry to be effective, all such
communications made to the pastor should be kept in the strictest confidence and
should be disclosed to no one without the specific consent of the person making the
communication; and
WHEREAS it is a part of the traditional discipline and practice of the Lutheran
church that a pastor should hold inviolate all communications made to him in his capac-
ity as a pastor; therefore,
BE IT RESOLVED: (1) that the Church Council recognizes and reaffirms that a
part of the ministry of a Lutheran pastor is to counsel with persons, to receive their
confessions, and to give advice, comfort, and guidance to those who seek it; and
(2) That the Church Council recognizes and reaffirms that it is a part of the traditional
discipline and practice of the Lutheran church that the pastor hold inviolate and dis-
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The merger agreement between the Lutheran Church in America,
the American Lutheran Church, and the Association of Evangelical
Lutheran Churches seems to provide that these resolutions, state-
ments, and constitutional provisions still apply with the advent of the
new Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.65 Thus, the privileged
nature of clergy-parishioner communications, with the few mentioned
exceptions, continues.
b. The Reformed Churches
The Reformed churches 66 likewise understand confession differ-
ently from the Roman Catholic Church. Ulrich Zwingli instructed
that "[a]uricular confession is nothing but a consultation, in which we
receive from him who God has appointed ... advice as to how we can
secure peace of mind," 67 and encouraged parishioners to confess.68
The Reformer John Calvin recognized that confession of sin is first
made to God.69 Calvin also distinguished between public and private
confession. The truly penitent might publicly confess sin either during
an ordinary worship service, following secret confession to God, or
during a time of public calamity when there was common guilt.70 Cal-
vin instructed that public sins (which would include most crimes)
should be confessed publicly. 71
If any man shall offend against the whole Church, Paul enjoins that
he be publicly reproved, so that even elders shall not be spared...
(I Timothy 5:20). The distinction, therefore, which Christ expressly
lays down, ought to be kept in mind, that no man may bring dis-
close to no one the confessions and communications made to him as a pastor without
the specific consent of the person making the communication.
MINUTES OF THE CHURCH COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN LUTHERAN CHURCH 16 (1960).
65. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 68.
66. The Reformed tradition traces its roots to the Calvinistic branch of the Protestant Refor-
mation in the sixteenth century. DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 3, at 982. The Re-
formed tradition finds its source in the work of two Reformers, Ulrich Zwingli and John Calvin,
who actually worked and ministered separately; however, their successors brought these two
roots together to form a common tradition. Id. at 988-92. In America, the Reformed tradition
includes eighteen Presbyterian, Reformed, and Congregationalist denominations. Id. Also, a
large number of Episcopalians, Baptists, and independent churches would also hold Reformed
theological convictions. Id. For an overview of the Reformed tradition as a whole and of its
American component, see id.
67. McNEILL, supra note 62, at 196.
68. Id. "Let us, therefore, confess frequently to the Lord, let us begin a new life frequently,
and if there is anything not clear let us go frequently to a wise scholar who looks not at the
pocket-book but at the conscience!" Id.
69. 1 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 633-34 (John T. McNeill ed. &
Ford Lewis Battles trans., 1960) [hereinafter CALVIN INSTITUTES].
70. See id at 634-36; McNEILL, supra note 62, at 199.
71. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 72.
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grace upon his brother, by rashly, and without necessity, divulging
secret offences.
72
According to Calvin, Scripture authorized two kinds of private con-
fession. 73 The first was the confession of sins to another Christian,
including a pastor.74 Private confession of sin was neither required
nor sacramental. 75 Rather, it was a voluntary act that a parishioner
undertook for the relief of conscience or soul. 76 The second kind of
confession was directed to an injured or offended believer or neigh-
bor, a practice rooted in Matthew 5:23-24. 77 This was available to re-
store a state of charity between the two believers. 78 If a parishoner
offended the whole church, confession was to be public, and forgive-
ness sought.79
While Calvin recognized the importance of both public and private
confession, he saw a special value in the private imploring of pastoral
assistance and private confession. 80 The pastor has a special place in
the ministry of the Church.
Therefore, let every believer remember that, if he be privately trou-
bled and afflicted with a sense of sins, so that without outside help
he is unable to free himself from them, it is a part of his duty not to
neglect what the Lord has offered to him by way of remedy.
Namely, that, for his relief, he should use private confession to his
own pastor; and for his solace, he should beg the private help of him
whose duty it is, both publicly and privately, to comfort the people
of God by the gospel teaching.81
Calvin also stated:
[I]n the first kind of confession, even though [the Apostle] James,
by not expressly determining on whose bosom we should unburden
ourselves, leaves us free choice to confess to that one of the flock of
the church who seems most suitable. Yet we must also preferably
choose pastors inasmuch as they should be judged especially quali-
fied above the rest.82
72. 2 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARY ON A HARMONY OF THE EVANGELISTS, MATTHEW, MARK,
AND LUKE 342-43 (William Pringle trans., 1949) [hereinafter CALVIN COMMENTARY].
73. See CALVIN INSTITUTES, supra note 69, at 636.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 636-37.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 636-38. Matthew 5:23-24 reads: "Therefore if thou bring thy gift to the altar, and
there rememberest that thy brother hath ought against thee; Leave there thy gift before the
altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." Id.
78. Id. at 637.
79. CALVIN INSTITUTES, supra note 69, at 637-38.
80. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 73.
81. CALVIN INSTITUTES, supra note 69, at 636-37.
82. Id. at 636.
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Calvin did not explicitly treat the Seal of Confession. 83 However,
because he carefully instructed parishioners to seek the assistance of
their pastors and to confess their sins in private, some have concluded
he would have upheld the Seal.8 4 Some have suggested that Calvin
would protect the confidence of confessed private offenses but not the
public offender. 85 The evidence, however, is inconclusive on the issue
of absolute confidentiality.
Other reformed churches have been even less explicit regarding the
Seal of Confession, although some references have been made to it.
The Reformed Church of France, in a pronouncement by the Synod of
1612, forbade a minister, except in the case of lese majeste, from "dis-
clos[ing] to the magistrates crimes declared by those who come to him
for counsel and consolation ... lest sinners be hindered from coming
to repentance, and from making a free confession of their faults. '8 6
On the European Continent, Reformed pastors at their consecration
promise "to keep secret those confessions which may be made for the
quieting of conscience. '87
Although Presbyterians are not required to confess, in 1987 the
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) reaffirmed
the historic position of the Presbyterian Church that it is a spiritual
and professional duty of clergy to hold in confidence matters re-
vealed to them in their counseling, caring and confessional minis-
tries, and that being called to testify in a court of law does not
negate this sacred obligation, the law of God being prior to the laws
of human courts.88
This same resolution also
[e]ncourages the clergy to become aware of the specific state laws
regarding confidentiality and work to develop statutes providing for
an effective clergy privilege.
83. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 72.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. McNEILL, supra note 62, at 209 (quoting the rule established by the Synod).
87. THURIAN, supra note 32, at 22 (quoting LITUROIE DE GENEVE 345 (1945)). Also, in his
Yale lectures, The Cure of Souls, Presbyterian scholar John Watson advised pastors to hold all
confidences to be inviolably sacred. McNEILL, supra note 62, at 259-60.
88. Report of the Advisory Council on Church and Society, A Resolution on Clergy Confiden-
tiality, MINUTES OF THE 199TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 344 (1987). This resolution was similar to
the statement made in 1981 by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United
States: "The nature of this office is such that a minister is under obligation not to reveal commu-
nications given to him in confidence without the authority of the person revealing the confi-
dence." MINUTES OF THE 121ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES 105 (1981). The statement continued: "[B]eing called to testify in a court of law does not
negate this sacred obligation, the law of God being prior to the law of human courts." Id.
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Urges presbyteries, sessions, and congregations to become informed
about some of the broader concerns relating to the issue of clergy
confidentiality. 89
Thus, the Reformed churches continue to carefully guard clergy-pa-
rishioner communications, although not so rigidly as the Catholic tra-
dition and without its penalties.
c. The Anglican Church and Progeny
After the Reformation in England, the clergy continued to absolve
parishioners of sin,90 and the privileged nature of confessional com-
munications continued. 91 As in the Roman Catholic Church, absolu-
tion in the Anglican Church was judicial or sacramental. 92 Early in the
Anglican tradition, private confession became voluntary,93 but the pri-
vacy of confession was protected by clergy and the law. One legal
scholar noted the continuation of the privilege in the common law
after the Reformation:
It follows, then, that not only was there nothing in the change
which took place at the Reformation to alter the case as to the privi-
lege attaching to confession, but that there was, on the contrary, an
express recognition of it by statute. For of course the recognition of
confession implies, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the
recognition of its secrecy, because such was the common law rule;
and if it were otherwise, no one would be likely to confess, and
therefore the directions to the Anglican clergy, to exhort their
penitents to confess, would be idle and futile .... It is not so clear
... that ministers of any other religious body, not believing in sacra-
mental confession, would be entitled to it; at all events, according to
the strict common law rule upon the subject, which, according to the
clearest authority, applied only to sacramental confession with a
view to sacramental absolution. But the later cases on the subject
89. A Resolution on Clergy Confidentiality, supra note 88, at 344.
90. See BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 446-52 (1549).
91. For a discussion of privileged clergy-parishioner communications in the common law, see
infra Part V.A.
92. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 55 (citing 175 Eng. Rep. 935).
93. McNEILL, supra note 62, at 220. The Anglican Church said:
And because it is requisite that no man should come to Holy Communion but with a
full trust of God's mercy, and with a quiet conscience, therefore if there be any of you
who by the means aforesaid (self-examination, confession to God, and satisfaction to a
wronged neighbor) cannot quiet his own conscience, but requireth further comfort or
counsel; then let him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned minister of
God's Word, and open his grief, that he may receive such ghostly counsel, advice, and
comfort, as his conscience may be relieved; and that by the ministry of God's Word he
may receive comfort and the benefit of absolution, to the quieting of his conscience,
and avoiding of all scruple or doubtfulness.
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seem to extend the privilege to any communications made to a spiri-
tual advisor as such, whether or not in sacramental confession. 94
In 1603, the Anglican Church's ecclesiastical law required those
who administered each parish to report evil deeds, crimes, and iniqui-
ties committed in the parish.95 However, the Church adopted the fol-
lowing exception in Canon 113:
Provided always that if any man confess his secret and hidden sins
to the minister for the unburdening of his conscience, and to receive
spiritual consolation and ease of mind from him; we do not in any
way bind the said minister by this our Constitution, but do straitly
charge and admonish him, that he do not at any time reveal and
make known to any person whatsoever any crime or offense so
committed to his trust and secrecy (except they be such crimes as by
the laws of the realm his own life may be called in question for
concealing the same), under pain of irregularity. 96
While the evidence is not clear, it appears that confession lost its
privileged nature in the secular, common law at some time during the
seventeenth century. 97 Still, the clergy continued to safeguard confi-
dences, and efforts have been made to restore the evidentiary privi-
lege to confessions made to Anglican clergy.98
In America, the Episcopal Church, which has its roots in the
Anglican Church, adopted the Book of Common Prayer, which pro-
vides: "The content of a confession is not normally a matter of subse-
quent discussion. The secrecy of a confession is morally absolute for
94. W. M. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 596 (1993).
95. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 56-57.
96. Nolan, supra note 40, at 655.
97. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 58-59.
98. One news article says:
The Most Rev. Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury, said today that the secrecy
of confessions made to priests could not be sanctioned in the canon law of the Church
of England until Parliament changed the laws of evidence.
Addressing the convocation of Canterbury at Church House .... he urged reaffirma-
tion of the principle of secrecy of the confessional. But he noted that priests had no
statutory right to refuse to answer a judge in a court of law.
The agenda of the present session of the convocation includes a resolution that would
reaffirm the principle of secrecy without giving it legal protection and another stating
that the church would welcome parliamentary action to exempt priests from the re-
quirements governing court testimony.
The Church of England is the state church and its canon law becomes the law of the
land upon the assent of the sovereign, who is the head of the church as well as the chief
of state. Royal assent, which is also required for acts of Parliament, would almost cer-
tainly be refused for canon laws to which Parliament objected ....
The present canon governing secrecy of the confessional dates from 1603 and is re-
garded as largely obsolete . . . . A Church of England spokesman said the seal of
confession had not been tested in the courts, at least in modern times, and that, in any
case, an Anglican priest would probably go to jail rather than disclose a confession.
Id. at 59-60.
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the confessor and must under no circumstances be broken." 99 A
clergyperson who violates this ecclesiastical rule is liable for present-
ment to trial within the Church.100 The General Convention of the
Episcopal Church has recognized that "the absolute secrecy of any
disclosures in the penitential relationship is ordered by The Episcopal
Church"'' 1 and regards this obligation as superior to the demands of
secular law.10 2
The Methodist movement, which in America includes the United
Methodist, African Methodist Episcopal, African Methodist Episco-
pal Zion, Christian Methodist Episcopal, Free Methodist, and Wes-
leyan denominations, also has its roots in the Anglican Church.10 3
The United Methodist Church, which is the largest of these denomina-
tions, states in its Book of Discipline: "Ministers of The United Meth-
odist Church are charged to maintain all confidences inviolate,
including confessional confidences."' 104
d. Baptist Denominations
Among Baptist 10 5 congregations, clergy-parishioner communica-
tions are understood in a different way. In the Baptist tradition, the
faithful are gathered together in independent, autonomous, disci-
99. BooK OF COMMON PRAYER 446 (1979).
100. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 61 (quoting Memorandum on "Privileged Communi-
cations" in the Episcopal Church 3).
101. Id. at 4.
102. The General Convention continued, saying: "Notwithstanding any restraints, demands,
or privileges imposed or conferred by civil law, the clergy of The Episcopal Church are bound to
the secrecy of the confessional and the inviolate priest-penitent relationship. The obligation
rises above the demands of the civil legal system." Id. at 4.
103. See id. at 61.
104. Id at 61-62 (quoting THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH § V
1440.4 (1980)).
105. "Baptist" is a broad term referring to a diverse collection of religious groups. DICTION-
ARY OF CHRISTIANrrY, supra note 3, at 110. Today, Baptists constitute one of the largest Protes-
tant and Free Church bodies. OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 129. Modern-day
Baptists are descendants of the Protestant Reformation, some from the Anabaptist tradition
while others trace their roots from the radical spiritual and political movements in the seven-
teenth century, movements which comprise the Radical Reformation. DICTIONARY OF CHRISTI-
ANITY, supra note 3, at 110-12. See EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 903-06;
OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 129-30. During the Reformation, the term "Anabap-
tist" referred to various groups that were distinct from groups in the Lutheran and Reformed
traditions. OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 47. The Baptist and Anabaptist traditions
are also referred to as the "Free Church" because of their separation from the established
church. See DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 3, at 450-52; EVANGELICAL DICTION-
ARY, supra note 47, at 903-05; OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 47. The Free Church
tradition includes a broad range of groups: the Amish, Baptists, the Brethren, Congregational-
ists, Mennonites, Moravians, and Quakers. See DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 3, at
450-52; OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 31, at 979.
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plined fellowships of believers.10 6 Each individual congregation is a
local fellowship of believers.10 7 With a congregational, rather than a
territorial or hierarchical form of organization, Baptist churches are
governed "through the voice of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the
members in each local assembly," rather than by an order of priests or
by higher or central courts.108
One historic function of a Baptist congregation or brotherhood of
believers is to hear confessions of sin.10 9 Like some other Protestant
traditions, Baptists do not confess their sins to clergy in words. 110
Rather, parishioners are to confess their sins to God in prayer, and
God, in his grace, forgives the penitent of all sin and guilt."' Baptists
are also enjoined to confess their sins to those they have offended. 112
The congregation or the offended person then recognizes the fact that
these sins are forgiven. 113 Thus, in Baptist theology, each congrega-
tion is considered an independent, disciplined fellowship of believers.
Clergy are fellow believers who are also part of this disciplined broth-
erhood. 114 Baptist parishioners may speak, pray, or seek counsel with
Baptist clergy, but these communications are understood as taking
place between two fellow believers or "brothers. '" 115 Each member of
106. See EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 122-23. One early Anabaptist writing,
Discipline of the Church at Rattenberg, provides a glimpse at what is meant by a disciplined
fellowship.
In the third place: when a brother or sister leads a disorderly life it shall be punished:
if he does so publicly [he] shall be kindly admonished before all the brethren (Gal. 2, 6;
I Cor. 5; II Thess, 3); if it is secret it shall be punished in secret, according to the com-
mand of Christ (Matt. 18) ....
In the ninth place: what is officially done among the brethren and sisters in the broth-
erhood shall not be made public before the world.
WILLIAM L. LUMPKIN, BAPTISTS CONFESSIONS OF FAITH 33-34 (1959).
107. See EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 122-23. One Baptist pastor and theo-
logian has defined the Baptist teaching on the church as follows:
A New Testament church of the Lord Jesus Christ is a local body of baptized believ-
ers who are associated by covenant in the faith and fellowship of the gospel, observing
the two ordinances of Christ, committed to His teachings, exercising the gifts, rights,
and privileges invested in them by His Word, and seeking to extend the gospel to the
ends of the earth.
This church is an autonomous body, operating through democratic processes under
the Lordship of Jesus Christ. In such a congregation members are equally responsible.
Its Scriptural officers are pastors and deacons.
HERSCHEL H. HOBBS, THE BAP-rIST FAITH AND MESSAGE 74, 75-82 (1971).
108. EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 123.
109. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 79.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 77-79.
112. Id. at 78-79.
113. Id.
114. See HOBBS, supra note 107, at 74, 77, 80-81.
115. Id.
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the congregation, clergy included, is equal, and while each has differ-
ent gifts, each member has a right and a duty in the government of the
local church. 116 Although clergy are ordained officers of the church
who provide oversight and instruction, they are merely first among
equals. 117 In Baptist theology, the clergy have no power or authority
over any soul. 18
Modern Baptists, in general, do not exercise congregational disci-
pline to the same extent or with the same seriousness as their fore-
bears. 119 However, many historic beliefs continue, including the
rejection of auricular confession to clergy, the recognition of all be-
lieving members of the fellowship as ministers, the aversion to recog-
nizing the power of clergy over souls, and the focus on each
independent fellowship of believers.120 In the American Baptist Con-
vention's Ministerial Code of Ethics, clergy resolve that they "will
hold as sacred all confidences shared with [them]. '' 121 The American
Baptist Convention has affirmed that its clergy are not morally obli-
gated to disclose confidential information.1 22 However, confidential-
ity is not absolute because it may be abridged when "conscience so
requires." 123
4. Jewish Religious Groups
While no distinct confessional tradition is found within historic Ju-
daism, various Jewish groups have developed practices regarding com-
munication between rabbis and members of the Jewish community.124
116. See EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 123.
117. See id. at 123-24.
118. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 77.
119. See id. at 79-80.
120. See HOBBS, supra note 107, at 74-82; EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 122-
24.
121. MINISTERS COUNCIL OF AMERICAN BAPTIST CONVENTION, MY CODE OF ETHICS 1.
122. BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 83-84. The convention stated:
The effective pastoral counseling of the ministry depends upon the assurance of those
who seek it that the information they reveal in confidence to their pastoral counselor
may be given with full freedom. The American Baptist Church in the U.S.A. expresses
its conviction that such confidential, spiritual communications to its ministers should
have the status of privileged communications ....
The American Baptist Church in the U.S.A. further declares that, whether or not
appropriate statutes are enacted, it is a principle with us that any of our number who
receive confidential information in the course of responding to a request for spiritual
counseling is not morally obligated to disclose it without consent of the other party.
American Baptist Policy Statement on Privileged Communications, in MINUTES OF THE EXECU-
TIVE COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL BOARD (June 19, 1978).
123. Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1983).
124. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 26, at 85-90.
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In America, the rabbi is regarded as a source of personal and spiritual
help, filling various roles, including those of theological scholar, reli-
gious instructor, and advisor. 125 Because rabbis commonly fill a coun-
seling and pastoral role, communications between them and members
of their community have religious importance. However, the perspec-
tives on those communications vary throughout modern American
Jewry.
One approach closely guards confidences, invariably protecting
them from disclosure. This approach was articulated by the New York
Board of Rabbis, stating:
It is essential for the proper work of the Rabbi in the community
that any confidence reposed in him by husband or wife, individually
or jointly, or anyone else who has come to him for counseling not be
divulged, and we hope that the Court will sustain this action.
Otherwise the confidential role of the Rabbi in counselling would
be completely vitiated, to the detriment of those who seek his
guidance. 2 6
However, this approach is not the only recognized approach among
members of the Jewish community. Conservative Jews have a differ-
ent view. Regarding the reporting of abuse disclosed in the context of
a rabbi-counselee relationship, the Committee on Jewish Laws and
Standards stated the following:
[Tihe provisions in Jewish law demanding that we save life and limb
would require those who know about an abusive situation to report
it to the civil authorities so that it might end, and, from the perspec-
tive of Jewish law, that would apply to rabbis no less than to any
other Jew. Rabbis who become aware of an abusive situation in a
counseling setting, however, should consult with an attorney to de-
termine whether civil law grants them the right to report the matter
in the specific case before them and, if not, they should seek to end
the abusive situation in some other way. 127
According to the Conservative movement, rabbis and teachers are un-
derstood to have a responsibility to be alert to instances of abuse and
to obey any legal requirement to report abuse cases to civil
authorities. 128
An important theme in Jewish law-incumbent on rabbi and lay
people alike-is the obligation to keep information confidential. The
source for this is generally believed to be Leviticus 19:16, "Thou shalt
125. Id. at 87.
126. Krugilov v. Krugilov, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961), appeal dismissed, 226
N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962).
127. ELLIOT DORFF, FAMILY VIOLENCE 28 (1995). This paper was adopted as the position of
the Jewish Conservative movement by the Committee on Jewish Laws and Standards. Id.
128. Id. at 40.
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not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people. ' 129 The prohi-
bition of talebearing certainly applies to a rabbi's confidential commu-
nications with congregants, but it also applies equally to anyone's
knowledge of his neighbor's activities, no matter how the knowledge
was gained. The prohibition against talebearing is not absolute, but
tempered by other ethical and legal considerations, including the
other obligation found in the same verse: "Do not stand by idly while
your brother's blood is being shed.' 130 If another human being is in
imminent harm,131 disclosure is mandated even if confidentiality is
lost.132 Jewish law would thus mandate disclosure of known elder
abuse, as well as other crimes, particularly if the crimes are avoidable.
In addition, a person who seeks religious counsel and assistance
must be bound by the dictates of the faith. It would seem inconsistent
for the congregant to be able to prevent the rabbi's disclosure when
Jewish law requires it. By revealing the secret to a rabbi, a Jew implic-
itly accepts Jewish law.
B. Clergy Communications from a Ministerial/Professional
Ethics Perspective
Clergy fill a multitude of personal and professional roles. To the
religious community, they are administrators and advisers, preachers
and public figures, counselors and teachers. To the local community,
they are fellow citizens and consumers, friends and neighbors, parents
and spouses. Functioning in these widely differing roles, clergy inter-
act with parishioners and non-parishioners alike in a whole host of
religious and non-religious communications. Because of the different
nature of these relationships and communications, different ethical or
moral obligations may arise, and different legal duties and protections
may attach.
Various professions have developed comprehensive ethical codes or
rules of professional conduct that regulate conduct and guide its mem-
bers on numerous ethical issues such as confidentiality. 133 Clergy,
129. Leviticus 19:16.
130. Id.
131. Under Jewish law, the harm is not limited to physical harm. A nonparty is obligated to
prevent his fellow from suffering a monetary harm if he is in a position to do so. See MICHAEL
J. BROYDE, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND JEWISH LAW 25-29 (1996).
132. Id.
133. The psychology and legal professions have comprehensive ethical codes or rules that
govern the professional conduct of their members. The American Psychological Association
adopted the following language regarding confidentiality which appears in its Ethical Principles
of Psychologists and Code of Conduct:
5.01 Discussing the Limits of Confidentiality. (a) Psychologists discuss with persons
and organizations with whom they establish a scientific or professional relationship ...
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however, have been slow to develop and adopt such comprehensive
ethical codes or rules. The professional conduct of clergy has been,
and continues to be, regulated by biblical mandate or the dictates of
one's denomination or religious tradition.1 34 However, the profes-
sional conduct of clergy has also been, and continues to be, regulated
by a clergyperson's own personal interests or values or certain profes-
sional or practical considerations. In fact, many clergy maintain confi-
dentiality for reasons other than doctrine and tradition.135 Important
to personal, ethical considerations are the three virtues of fidelity, jus-
(1) the relevant limitations on confidentiality, including limitations where applicable...
and (2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated through their services.
5.02 Maintaining Confidentiality. Psychologist have a primary obligation and take rea-
sonable precautions to respect the confidentiality rights of those with whom they work
or consult, recognizing that confidentiality may be established by law, institutional
rules, or professional or scientific relationships.
5.05 Disclosures. (a) Psychologists disclose confidential information without the con-
sent of the individual only as mandated by law, or where permitted by law for a valid
purpose, such as (1) to provide needed professional services to the patient or the indi-
vidual or organizational client, (2) to obtain appropriate professional consultations, (3)
to protect the patient or client or others from harm, or (4) to obtain payment for serv-
ices, in which instance disclosure is limited to the minimum that is necessary to achieve
the purpose.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE
OF CONDUCT (1992). The American Bar Association provides the following instruction regard-
ing confidentiality:
RULE 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly author-
ized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;...
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
134. See supra Part I.A.
135. Regarding the absence of rules mandating confidentiality in Protestant denominations,
Douglas Jones noted:
Such stringent rules are not written into the discipline of most Protestant denomina-
tions and other religious groups. However, the vast majority of ministers labor under
at least an implied restriction and feel that the betrayal of a confidence would be tanta-
mount to the destruction of their effectiveness as members of the clergy. Thus, while
the religious organizations to which many ministers belong do not have specific canons
or rules regarding the safeguarding of confidential information shared with clergy, the
question of revealing or not revealing information received in confidence involves the
matter of conscience as well as the matter of a relationship with the courts.
Yellin, supra note 123, at 132 (quoting DOUGLAS JONES, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS WITH
CLERGY IN THE UNITED STATES-AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE LAWS OF EACH STATE, TER-
RITORY AND PROTECTORATE CONCERNING SUCH PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS vi-vii).
Seward Reese presented an opposing position, arguing that
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tice, and prudence.136 Some clergy may maintain secrecy because
their consciences compel them to maintain confidentiality. Others
adopt confidentiality standards for themselves because they are mor-
ally persuaded to behave in a certain way.
Professional or practical considerations provide a great impetus in a
clergyperson's decision regarding confidentiality. Clergy, like other
professionals, understand the maintenance of confidential communi-
cations as essential to their effectiveness with those they serve. In
these relationships, trust is essential. And, if confidences are not pro-
tected, trust is undermined, and the effectiveness of the relationship is
diminished. The law protects the communication between persons in
some special relationships, including lawyer-client, 137 husband-wife, 138
physician/therapist-patient, 39 and clergy-penitent.1 40 The concept of
"privileged communication" is based on a public policy interest in pro-
tecting these special relationships and the communications that occur
within them. 141 Certainly, for many clergy, legal obligations and lia-
bilities are also integral factors in their determinations regarding
confidentiality.
Recently, an increasing number of professional bodies have estab-
lished comprehensive ethical codes or rules to govern professional
conduct, including bodies associated with clergy. One example is pro-
vided by the American Association of Pastoral Counselors which has
developed a Code of Ethics. This code of conduct provides a more
comprehensive treatment of clergy-parishioner relationships and com-
munications and provides the following instruction regarding confi-
dentiality in clergy-parishioner communications:
As members of AAPC we respect the integrity and protect the
welfare of all persons with whom we are working and have an obli-
gation to safeguard information about them that has been obtained
in the course of the counseling process.
[t]he ministers of most Protestant church likewise are obligated to keep confidential the
communications revealed to them in their ministerial capacity. Although many denom-
inations have not spelled out the precise description or definition of their disci-
pline,their uncodified discipline or practice is as binding on them as though it were
written.
Seward Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 55, 69 (1963).
136. RICHARD M. GULA, ETHICS IN PASTORAL MINISTRY 130-32 (1996).
137. See CHARLES TiLFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE ch. 10 (John William
Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992).
138. Id. at ch. 9.
139. Id. at ch. 11.
140. See generally Robert E. Regan & John T. Macartney, Professional Secrecy and Privileged
Communications, 2 CATH. LAw. 3 (1956) (discussing the various professional relationships that
have "privileged communications" and related policy considerations).
141. GULA, supra note 136, at 126-27.
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B. We treat all communications from clients with professional
confidence.
D. We do not disclose client confidences to anyone, except: as
mandated by law; to prevent a clear and immediate danger to some-
one; in the course of a civil, criminal or disciplinary action arising
from the counseling where the pastoral counselor is a defendant;...
or by previously obtained written permission. In cases involving
more than one persons (as client) written permission must be ob-
tained from all legally accountable persons who have been present
during the counseling before any disclosure can be made.
F. We do not use these standards of confidentiality to avoid inter-
vention when it is necessary, e.g., when there is evidence of abuse of
minors, the elderly, the disabled, the physically or mentally
incompetent. 142
142. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PASTORAL COUNSELORS CODE OF ETHICS Principle 4
(1994). The American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy in its Code of Ethics states:
2. Confidentiality
[Marriage and family] [t]herapists respect and guard confidences of each individual
client.
2.1 Marriage and family therapists may not disclose client confidences except: (a) as
mandated by law; (b) to prevent a clear and immediate danger to a person or persons;
(c) where the therapist is a defendant in a civil, criminal, or disciplinary action arising
from the therapy (in which case client confidences may be disclosed only in the course
of that action); or (d) if there is a waiver previously obtained in writing, and such infor-
mation may be revealed only in accordance with the terms of the waiver ....
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY CODE OF ETHICS 2 (1991).
The Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice of the American Counseling Association states:
Section B: Confidentiality
B.1. Right to Privacy
a. Respect for Privacy. Counselors respect their clients' right to privacy and avoid
illegal and unwarranted disclosures of confidential information.
b. Client Waiver. The right to privacy may be waived by the client or their legally
recognized representative.
c. Exceptions. The general requirement that counselors keep information confiden-
tial does not apply when disclosure is required to prevent clear and imminent danger to
the client or others or when legal requirements demand that confidential information
be revealed. Counselors consult with other professionals when in doubt as to the valid-
ity of an exception.
e. Court Ordered Disclosure. When court ordered to release confidential informa-
tion without a client's permission, counselors request to the court that the disclosure
not be required doe to potential harm to the client or counseling relationship.
f. Minimal Disclosure. When circumstances require the disclosure of confidential
information, only essential information is revealed. To the extent possible, clients are
informed before confidential information is disclosed.
CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE OF THE AMERICAN COUNSELING ASSOCIATION
B (1995).
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This trend of developing comprehensive codes of ethics is likely to
continue as clergy and their denominations understand the criminal
and civil liabilities that may result from their failure to act in man-
dated ways.
III. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT
Elder abuse and neglect is a profoundly disturbing subject. 143 De-
spite biblical injunction 144 and modern statutory protections, 145 elder
mistreatment is a pervasive phenomenon, occurring in all segments of
our population. 46 Approximately 1.5 to 2 million cases of moderate to
severe mistreatment occur each year,1 47 and its prevalence appears to
be increasing. 148 The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study esti-
143. Although physical and sexual abuse are the most dramatic manifestations, far more com-
mon are psychological abuse, financial exploitation and neglect of the elderly. The National Ag-
ing Resource Center on Elder Abuse estimated that "55% of the reported cases in 22 states
during 1988 were determined to be self-neglect or self-abuse cases." NATIONAL AGING RE-
SOURCE CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, AN INFORMATION GUIDE FOR
PROFESSIONALS AND CONCERNED CITIZENS 5-6 (1991). Estimates of the percentage of incidence
in 24 states in 1988, excluding self-abuse and neglect, include: neglect 37.2%, physical abuse
26.3%, financial exploitation 20%, emotional abuse 11%, all other types 2.8%, sexual abuse
1.6%, and unknown 1.1%. Id. The most recent statistics reporting substantiated new cases in
1996 by state Adult Protective Services agencies generally confirm these figures. National
Center on Elder Abuse, The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Findings 2 (visited
Sept.1998) <http://www.aoa.gov/abuse/report/Cexecsum.htm>. Abuse is illegal in every state.
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.5099(1) (Michie Supp. 1997).
[Any person who abuses an older person, causing the older person to suffer unjustifi-
able physical pain or mental suffering is guilty of a category B felony and shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than two
years and a maximum term of not more than six years, unless a more severe penalty is
prescribed by law ....
Id. See also ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-28-103 (a)-(b)(1) (Michie 1997).
It shall be unlawful for any person.., to abuse, neglect, or exploit any person subject to
protection ... of this chapter. Any person or caregiver who purposely abuses an en-
dangered or impaired adult in violation of the provisions of this chapter, if the abuse
causes serious physical injury or substantial risk of death, shall be guilty of a Class B
felony and shall be punished as provided by law.
Id. WYo. STAT. § 35-20-109 (Michie 1997) ("A person who abuses, neglects, exploits or aban-
dons a disabled adult is guilty of a misdemeanor .... ).
144. See, e.g., Exodus 20:12 ("Honor thy father and mother"); Leviticus 19:32 ("You shall rise
before the aged and show deference to the old"); Ephesians 6:1 ("Children, obey your parents in
the Lord, for this is right").
145. See infra notes 191-236 and accompanying text.
146. National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Executive Summary, supra note 143, at 1. Steuer
& Austin, Family Abuse of the Elderly, 28 J. AM. GERIATRIC Soc'Y. 372-76 (1980).
147. 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at XI (estimating more than 1.5 mil-
lion persons may be victims of such abuse each year, and the number is rising); Pillemer &
Finkelhor, supra note 9, at 51-57 (estimating 700,000-1,100,000 cases of elder mistreatment, ex-
cluding financial exploitation, more than a decade ago).
148. 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at XI. Ninety percent of states re-
ported to the Committee that the incidence of elder mistreatment was increasing. Id. at XIV. A
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mated 450,000 new cases of elder abuse and neglect in 1996 in domes-
tic settings.149 In almost 90% of incidents with a known perpetrator, it
is a family member; two-thirds of perpetrators are adult children or
spouses. 150 Although women represent only 58% of persons over 60
years of age, they comprise more than two-thirds of those subjected to
abuse and neglect.1 51 Moreover, the most vulnerable aged, those 80
years and over, are abused and neglected at two to three times their
proportion of the elderly population.1 52 The oldest old are also vic-
tims of more than one-half of neglect cases.153 We are failing badly in
our mission to protect senior citizens.
The four main types of elder mistreatment are physical abuse, psy-
chological abuse, financial exploitation, and neglect. 154 Physical abuse
is violent conduct resulting in pain and/or bodily injury. Common ex-
amples include hitting, sexual molestation, and physical or chemical
restraints.1 55 Psychological abuse is behavior that induces significant
mental anguish and may consist of threats to harm, institutionalize, or
recent California elder mistreatment bill noted in its proposed legislative findings that 225,000
incidents of adult abuse occur in California annually, an increase of 1000% since 1986-1987. S.
2199, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998). These findings were adopted into law and are codified at
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.07 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
149. National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Executive Summary, supra note 143, at 1.
150. Id at 4.
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The current federal definition includes three major types of elder maltreatment-physi-
cal abuse, neglect, and exploitation-and clearly recognizes self-neglect as a form of neglect. 42
U.S.C. § 3002(23-24) (1994). Under the federal statute, "abuse" is defined as the "willful inflic-
tion of injury, unreasonable confinement, intimidation, or cruel punishment with resulting physi-
cal harm, pain, or mental anguish; or deprivation by ... a caregiver, of goods or services...
necessary to avoid physical harm, mental anguish, or mental illness." 42 U.S.C. § 3002(13)
(1994). "Neglect" is the "failure to provide for oneself goods or services that are necessary to
avoid physical harm, mental anguish, or mental illness" or the "failure of a caregiver to provide
the goods or services." 42 U.S.C. § 3002(37) (1994). The term "exploitation" means "the illegal
or improper act or process of an individual, including a caregiver, using the esources of an older
individual for monetary or personal benefit, profit, or gain." 42 U.S.C. § 3002(26) (1994). A
"caregiver" is an individual "who has the responsibility for the care of an older individual, either
voluntarily, by contract, by receipt of payment for care, or as a result of the operation of law."
42 U.S.C. § 3002(20) (1994). 42 U.S.C. § 3002(24) (1994) notes that "elder abuse" refers to
"abuse of an older individual" but does not specify any particular age. Id. However, because
other provisions under Title III of the Older Americans Act are applicable to people who are
sixty years of age and older, it may be assumed that the Congressional intent is to cover the
elderly in the same age group with the new elder abuse prevention program. Id. The language
clearly implies that the federal elder abuse definitions cover both domestic and institutional
abuse. The 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-27 sets out numerous docu-
mented and graphic case studies that illustrate each type of abuse & neglect.
155. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 473(6)(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). "'Physical abuse'
means the non-accidental use of force that results in bodily injury, pain or impairment, including
but not limited to, being slapped, burned, cut, bruised or improperly physically restrained." Id.
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isolate the elder adult. 156 While the effects of physical abuse are usu-
ally visible, the effects of psychological abuse are less obvious; how-
ever, psychological abuse can cause a wide range of responses
including depression, nervous system disorders, fearfulness, physical
illness, and, in extreme cases, suicide. 157 Financial abuse or exploita-
tion is theft or conversion of property by the elder's relatives, care-
givers, or others, ranging from expropriating small amounts of cash to
inducing the elder to sign away bank accounts or other property.158
"'Abuse' means the nonaccidental infliction of physical pain, injury or mental injury." IDAHO
CODE § 39-5302(a) (1997).
Examples of documented physical abuse cases can be found in many sources. A few illustra-
tive examples from the 1990 HOUSE ELDER ABUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 follow.
Nevada authorities report that an 80-year-old woman there was hospitalized with a
serious knee injury. Her grandson had knocked her to the ground and stolen her car
despite her protests. Reportedly, the grandson had been physically abusive to her on
several occasions and had stolen other cars.
In New Jersey, a 70-year-old woman was beaten by her 32-year-old son, who did not
contribute to the household expenses and whom she suspected of abusing alcohol and
drugs. She said she was terrified of his unprovoked attacks and that he had broken her
glasses and once attacked her in bed while she was sleeping. A social worker saw her
badly bruised left breast, the result of the son punching her.
Id. at 3.
156. For example, the North Dakota Code says: "'Abuse' means any willful act or omission of
a caregiver ... which results in .... mental anguish ..... N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.2-01(1)
(1995). "'Abuse' means willful and unjustified infliction of pain, injury, or mental anguish ......
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.1395(4)(a)(1) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997).
The 1990 HousE ELDER ABUSE REPORT illustrates:
An elderly woman in Oregon lived with her son, who was diagnosed as a paranoid
schizophrenic and who suffered additional mental impairment from alcohol and drug
abuse which began at about age 14. He tormented her in several ways, one day becom-
ing angry, grabbing his mother's arm, twisting it and spinning her around in her wheel-
chair. He often threatened her verbally and was physically abusive. Once he crept up
behind his mother and yelled, "I could make you have a heart attack!" In Montana,
the nephew of an elderly woman threatened repeatedly to kill her and set fire to her
ranch. On one occasion, he gave her a black eye and bruises when she refused to give
him money.
The 1990 HousE ELDER ABUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
157. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 102D CONG., AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO LAWS AND
PROGRAMS ADDRESSING ELDER ABUSE 3 (Comm. Print 1991).
158. See Miss. CODE. ANN. § 43-47-5(i) (West 1993). "Exploitation" shall mean the illegal or
improper use of a vulnerable adult or his resources for another's profit or advantage.
Illustrative examples of documented financial abuse cited in the 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 12-13 include:
Muriel, an elderly woman in Oklahoma, was being terrorized by her adopted son, who
would often display his violent temper to obtain and then squander her money. The
son and his wife gained control of Muriel's money by obtaining power of attorney,
which allowed them to cash her Social Security and retirement checks each month and
to gain access to her savings account. The pair bought a new boat, new car and other
luxury items with his mother's money. Soon Muriel, now 78, was penniless. In Dela-
ware, an elderly couple, both suffering from Alzheimer's disease, were the victims of
actual and threatened abuse by their granddaughter. She cashed certificates of deposit
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Financial exploitation is often accompanied by physical or psychologi-
cal abuse. 159 Neglect, either passive or active, is the failure to fulfill a
care-taking obligation necessary to maintain the elder's physical and
mental well-being; examples include abandonment and denial of, or
failure to provide, food or health-related services.' 60 Neglect may be
intentional or negligent resulting from the caretaker's own infirmity or
ignorance.' 6' Such neglect stems from an overwhelmed and/or dys-
functional care-giving system, the isolation of the elder, refusal of the
elder to accept assistance, or other complex and multi-factorial
causes.162 The above categories often overlap, and their use varies in
worth $35,000, although they were in her grandparents' names. The granddaughter has
a history of violent behavior and had previously been admitted to Delaware State Hos-
pital for psychiatric care.
Id.
159. 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 12-13.
160. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-101(3)(A) (Michie 1997) ("'Neglect' means [n]egligently
failing to provide necessary treatment, rehabilitation, care, food, clothing, shelter, supervision, or
medical services to an endangered or impaired adult."). "'Abuse of an elder or a dependent
adult' means physical abuse, neglect, . . . or the deprivation by a care custodian of goods or
services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering." CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 15610.07 (West Supp. 1998).
Illustrative examples of neglect include:
When apartment cleaners and painters entered a Texas apartment vacated by the ten-
ants 3 weeks previously, they discovered an elderly woman in a back room. This stroke
victim, in her mid-80's, was bedbound and incontinent, unable to call for help. Her
relatives moved out one night, leaving her alone with a glass of water and one plate of
food. The woman was found starving, dehydrated and lying in her urine and feces. She
had seen no one in the 3 weeks since her family moved. She died in the hospital several
days later. Relatives stated that they couldn't afford to take her along.
In Tennessee, an 84-year-old man was found in a urine-soaked, feces-covered bed.
He had a staph infection. His care was supposed to be handled by his 50-year-old, low-
functioning daughter, who was totally financially dependent on him. She fought the
notion of placing him in a nursing home because she would be left without financial
support if that happened.
1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
161. Id.
162. Self-neglect refers to an individual's failure to provide himself or herself with the necessi-
ties of life such as food and shelter. Id. Classifying self-neglect as abuse is controversial because
it may result from society's failure to provide for the needs of the elderly, or from an autono-
mous life style choice of a competent but eccentric individual.
Examples of self-neglect include:
In Massachusetts, a 62-year-old mildly retarded man was trying to care for his wheel-
chair-bound mother in her home, which had been ravaged by fire. Both slept on bare
mattresses on dirt floors. About 65 cats, chickens, dogs and rabbits ran in and out of
the house. The son got their water from a nearby mountain stream and buried their
waste in the yard.
In Texas, paramedics responded to a call and found a 95-year-old woman lying in a
pool of urine, wrapped in a blanket. When they tried to move her, her skin came off in
layers.
Id. at 7.
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research.1 63 More importantly, no standard legal definitions exist.
Sexual and emotional abuse, for example, are specifically outlawed in
some states but would be subsumed in more general statutes in
others.164 Whether behavior is characterized as abusive or neglectful
may depend on the frequency, duration, intensity, or severity of the
mistreatment.165
A. Etiology
Experts have advanced various explanations for the cause of mis-
treatment of the elderly, but no consensus has emerged.166 The diver-
sity of cases reflects their multiple causations: no single theory can
reasonably be expected to fully explain this complex phenomenon. 167
The various theories on causes of elder abuse are also applied to other
types of domestic violence, 168 and their usefulness has been confirmed
by correlating predicted risk factors with actual patterns of elder mis-
treatment. 169 The literature is too abundant to discuss here in detail.
A summary of the main theoretical constructs explaining mistreat-
ment, however, is important to appreciate the significance of later
legal arguments. Five main theories have been proposed.
163. Some researchers categorize "withholding of personal care" as physical abuse. Elizabeth
Lau & Jordan Kosberg, Abuse of the Elderly by Informal Care Providers, AGING 10-15 (1979).
Others place it under "active neglect." RICHARD L. DOUGLAS ET AL., A STUDY OF MALTREAT.
MENT OF THE ELDERLY AND OTHER VULNERABLE ADULTS (1980).
164. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-451(1)(a-d), (7) (West 1997) (defining abuse as
"(a) Intentional infliction of physical harm. (b) Injury caused by negligent acts or omissions. (c)
Unreasonable confinement. (d) Sexual abuse or sexual assault.") with IDAHO CODE § 39-
5302(1), (6) (1997) (defining abuse as the nonaccidental infliction of physical pain, injury or
mental injury) and ALA. CODE § 38-9-2 (1), (6), (10) (1997) (defining abuse and emotional abuse
as the willful or reckless infliction of emotional or mental anguish or the use of a physical or
chemical restraint, medication or isolation as punishment or as a substitute for treatment or care
of any protected person) with IND. CODE. ANN. § 12-10-3-2(1-3) (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (fail-
ing to mention of emotional abuse, or anguish).
165. KAREN F. STEIN, NATIONAL AGING RESOURCE CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, ELDER
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, A NATIONAL RESEARCH AGENDA (1991).
166. ROSALIE S. WOLF & KARL A. PILLEMER, HELPING ELDERLY VICTIMS: THE REALITY OF
ELDER ABUSE 17 (1989).
167. Edward F. Ansello, Causes and Theories, in ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION OF
OLDER PERSONS 9-10 (Lorin A. Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall eds., 1996).
168. Jacquelyn Campbell & Janice Humphreys, Theories of Violence, in NURSING CARE OF
SURVIVORS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 6 (2d ed. 1993).
169. Ansello, supra note 167, at 14.
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1. Psychopathology and Caretaker Addiction
In some cases, the abuser may be addicted to drugs or alcohol 170 or
have psychiatric problems. 171 Such conditions may diminish inhibi-
tions against abusive acts or provide an illusory excuse for violent or
neglectful behavior. Psychological issues may include acute or major
mental disorders172 and enduring maladaptive personality or character
disorders. 73
2. Dependency Relationships
a. Care-giver Stress from Elder's Dependency
The emotional and financial strains of caring for a dependent,
sometimes impaired, elderly person may produce overwhelming pres-
sures and stresses on the care-giver. 174 As the costs-financial, physi-
cal and emotional-grow and the rewards diminish, the relationship is
seen as inequitable and stifling. When the care-giver can no longer
cope nor escape, abusive behaviors may result.1 75
b. Abuser's Dependence on Elder
While this seems like the reverse of the prior dependency theory,
both may help explain a single situation. Where the caretaker is de-
pendent, financially or otherwise, on the elder, the response to such
perceived powerlessness may be resentment and mistreatment. The
care-giver's dependence may be due to a variety of conditions such as
economic impoverishment, mental illness, or substance abuse.176
3. Intergenerational Violence
Some theorists propose that domestic violence is learned in the
home and passed to subsequent generations. According to these re-
searchers, frequently those who abuse the elderly were raised in
homes where domestic violence occurred, and thus a "cycle of vio-
170. Addiction Problems a Factor in Elder Abuse, 5 ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY. 5
(1993); Ansello, supra note 167, at 15.
171. WOLF & PILLEMER, supra note 166, at 24.
172. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 25 (4th ed. 1994).
173. Id. at 630.
174. Our oldest seniors (80 years & over) are abused and neglected two to three times their
proportions of elder population. National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Conclusions, supra note
143, at 3.
175. See MARY JOY QUINN & SUSAN K. TOMITA, ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CAUSES,
DIAGNOSIS, AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 28 (1986).
176. David Finkelhor, Common Features of Family Abuse, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES:
CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 17-26 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).
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lence" develops.177 Where the elder is a parent of the abuser, an addi-
tional element of retaliation (conscious or otherwise) toward the
perceived prior abuser is possible.178
4. Social Isolation
Violent families are more likely than others to be socially isolated
and hidden from outside scrutiny. Twenty five percent of elders live
alone, and many interact almost exclusively with family members. 179
Child abuse, in contrast, is far more readily identified because of com-
pulsory attendance of children at school. Isolated elders are more
likely to be abused than those with extended social support net-
works. 180 While such isolation does not necessarily cause mistreat-
ment, it may be a precipitating factor.' 8'
5. Societal Attitudes and Conditions
Unquestionably, general societal factors, such as ageism, 18 2 contrib-
ute to elder mistreatment. Our youth-oriented notions of beauty and
power tend to degrade those who have lived into their sixth decade
and beyond.183 Older Americans are apt to be viewed as powerless,
177. 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 28-30. See WOLF & PILLEMER,
supra note 166, at 24.
178. WOLF & PILLEMER, supra note 166, at ,24.
179. National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Conclusions, supra note 143, at 2.
180. Bella English, It's Society's Secret Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1989, at 17 (reporting
that elder abuse thrives on total isolation-it is a "secret crime").
181. QUINN & TOMITA, supra note 175, at 13-14; National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Con-
clusions, supra note 143, at 2.
182. The term "ageism," coined in 1968 by Dr. Robert N. Butler, the first director of the
National Institute on Aging, has been defined as:
[A] systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they are old,
just as racism and sexism accomplish this with skin color and gender. Old people are
categorized as senile, rigid in thought and manner, old-fashioned in morality and skills
.... Ageism allows the younger generation to see older people as different from them-
selves; thus they subtly cease to identify with their elders as human beings.
See Robert N. Butler, Dispelling Ageism: The Cross-Cutting Intervention, ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 138, 139 n.2 (1989) [hereinafter Butler, Dispelling Ageism]. Dr. Butler's Pulit-
zer prize-winning work in the mid-seventies was both the baseline and catalyst for subsequent
scholarly interest in ageism. See ROBERT N. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA
(1975) [hereinafter BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE].
183. A recent bestseller on the theme of intergenerational relations notes how American soci-
ety associates youth closely with.beauty and power.
On my ride from the Boston airport, I had counted the billboards that featured young
and beautiful people. There was a handsome young man in a cowboy hat, smoking a
cigarette, two beautiful young women smiling over a shampoo bottle, a sultry-looking
teenager with her jeans unsnapped, and a sexy woman in a black velvet dress, next to a
man in a tuxedo, the two of them snuggling a glass of scotch. Not once did I see anyone
who would pass for over thirty-five.
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unproductive, and even parasitical. 184 A disproportionate number of
abused elderly persons are women, and pervasive sexist attitudes, ad-
ded to ageist ones, contribute to the climate in which their abuse and
neglect occur.185 Older women are also especially vulnerable econom-
ically. Of the elderly population below the poverty line, more than
70% are women.' 86 Unsafe and crowded neighborhoods and inade-
quate living conditions create an environment in which elder abuse is
more likely.' 87 Seasonal or structural unemployment is also a signifi-
cant factor, because family violence tends to be more frequent when
the major wage-earner is out of work.188
B. Failure to Self-Report Abuse & Neglect
Despite the shocking statistics on elder abuse and neglect, elder
abuse victims rarely report its occurrence to public authorities.189
Elder abuse is often hidden and is rarely revealed to those outside the
family circle.190 The aged person may desire to "save face" and thus
be unwilling to create or exacerbate intrafamilial conflicts. Embar-
rassment, shame, lack of third-party support, and/or failure of the
criminal justice system to respond to his or her needs also contribute
to the lack of reporting. 191 Other contributing factors are dependency
MITCH ALBOM, TUESDAYS WITH MORRIE: AN OLD MAN, A YOUNG MAN, AND LIFE'S GREAT-
EST LESSON 117 (1997).
184. Butler, Dispelling Ageism, supra note 182, at 140-41.
185. National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Conclusions, supra note 143, at 3. The typical
elder abuse victim is a woman of poor to modest means over 75 years of age. She is generally
widowed, living with relatives, and frail and vulnerable due to physical and/or mental disabilities.
TOSHIO TATARA, NATIONAL AGING RESOURCE CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, SUMMARIES OF NA-
TIONAL ELDER ABUSE DATA: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF STATE STATISTICS BASED ON A
SURVEY OF STATE ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICE AND AGING AGENCIES 18-19 (1990); QUINN &
TOMITA, supra note 175, at 31; WOLF & PILLEMER, supra note 166, at 32.
186. QUINN & TOMITA, supra note 175, at 82-85.
187. 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 32.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 42 (estimating only one in every eight cases of elder abuse is ever reported);
Pillemer & Finkelhor, supra note 9, at 55 (estimating only one in fourteen cases of elder mis-
treatment is reported to authorities); National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Executive Summary,
supra note 143, at 3 (estimating one in six cases is reported).
190. See Ansello, supra note 167, at 2; Karl A. Pillemer & Rosalie S. Wolf, Domestic Violence
Against the Elderly, in CONTROVERSIES IN FAMILY VIOLENCE 237-50 (R. Gelles & D. Loesike
eds., 1993).
191. See National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Conclusions, supra note 143, at 5 ("Elderly
persons who are unable to care for themselves, and/or are mentally confused and depressed are
especially vulnerable to abuse and neglect as well as self-neglect."). Police traditionally managed
violence in the home very differently from violence on the street. They tried to mediate domes-
tic "disputes." [T]he message was that assaults in the home were permissible. Id. Victims were
not afforded adequate protection and assailants were not subject to consequences. Howard
Holtz & Kathleen Furniss, The Health Care Provider's Role in Domestic Violence, 8 TRENDS IN
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on the abuser, fear of institutionalization, feelings of powerlessness, or
lack of self-esteem. 192 In addition, the fact that abused and neglected
elderly people tend to be socially isolated is itself a barrier to report-
ing, because they have fewer contacts and weaker support systems
than other aged persons.193 Thus, victims of elder abuse are unlikely
to have the support that would encourage free choice to self-report.
Some feel that abusive treatment is normal' 94 or that recourse through
the law is unavailable or unavailing.195
C. Public Policy Response to Elder Abuse & Neglect
The vast majority of states mandate a variety of professionals-e.g.,
doctors, nurses, social workers' 96-or "any person"' 97 to report sus-
pected cases of elder abuse and neglect. Professionals are specifically
included as mandatory reporters because of their significant interac-
tions with the elderly and their ability to gather information and alert
HEALTH CARE, L. & ETHics 47, 50 (1993); S.K. Steinmetz, Dependency, Stress and Violence
Between Middle Aged Caregivers and Their Elderly Parents, in ABUSE & MALTREATMENT OF
THE ELDERLY 134-49 (J.I. Kosberg ed.).
192. A. Paul Blunt, Financial Exploitation of the Incapacitated: Investigation & Remedies, 5 J.
ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 19-32 (1993) (discussing feelings of powerlessness and lack of self-
esteem among elderly victims); David P. Matthews, Comment, The Not-So-Golden Years: The
Legal Response to Elder Abuse, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 653, 662 (1998) (positing that many abused
elders do not come forward on their own and that only mandatory reporting will help them).
193. National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Conclusions, supra note 143, at 2. See Karl A.
Pillemer, Social Isolation & Elder Abuse, 8 RESPONSE 2-4, 51-57 (1984) (discussing lack of sup-
port systems). See also Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991).
194. See L.W. Griffin, Elder Mistreatment Among Rural African-Americans, 6 J. ELDER
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1-29 (1994).
195. See, e.g., Blunt, supra note 192, at 19-32; Holtz & Furniss, supra note 191, at 50.
196. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-8(a) (1992 & Supp. 1996) ("All physicians and other practi-
tioners of the healing arts having reasonable cause to believe that any adult protected under the
provisions of this chapter has been subjected to physical abuse, neglect or exploitation shall
report or cause a report to be made ...."). "A physician, hospital intern or resident, surgeon,
... psychologist, or social worker, who has a reasonable basis to believe that abuse or neglect of
the adult has occurred ... shall immediately report or cause reports to be made ...." ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454 (West 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-203(a)(1) (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1995).
Whenever any physician .... registered nurse, hospital personnel,.., social worker, ....
mental health professional, .... has reasonable cause to suspect that an endangered
adult has been subjected to ... abuse, he shall immediately report or cause a report to
be made in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Id.
197. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7 (1997). "[A]ny person having reasonable cause to believe
that a vulnerable adult has been or is being abused, neglected, or exploited shall report such
information ... ." Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
public authorities. In eight nonmandatory states, reports to protective
bodies are voluntary but encouraged. 198
Six states specifically mandate clergy to report suspected maltreat-
ment.199 Many others require every person to report, which obviously
would include clergy. 200 Moreover, clergy often function in various
198. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-3.1-104(1)(a) (West 1990).
Any person specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) who has observed a dis-
abled adult and because of such observation has reasonable cause to know or suspect
that a disabled adult has been subjected to abuse, neglect, or exploitation or is in cir-
cumstances or conditions which would reasonably result in such abuse, neglect, or ex-
ploitation or that a disabled adult constitutes a danger to himself or is believed to be
endangering the health and safety of others in his immediate vicinity, is urged to imme-
diately report or cause a report to be made to the office of the county director.
Id. "Any person wishing to report a case of alleged or suspected abuse or neglect may make
such a report to an agency designated to receive such reports under this Act or to the Depart-
ment." 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/4(a) (West 1993). "A person who has reasonable cause to
believe that a vulnerable adult is the subject of abuse, neglect or exploitation may report the
information to the county adult protective services provider." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-409(a)
(West. Supp. 1997). See also N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAw § 473 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-25.2-03 (1989); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225-302(a) (West 1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 22-46-6 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.90(4)(a)(2) (West 1997).
199. [T]he following persons who, in the performance of their professional duties,
have reasonable cause to believe that a vulnerable adult suffers from abandonment,
exploitation, abuse, neglect, or self-neglect, shall, not later than 24 hours after first hav-
ing cause for the belief, report the belief to the department's central information and
referral service for vulnerable adults: ... a member of the clergy.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (Michie 1996).
Any... clergyman .... who has reasonable cause to suspect or believe that any elderly
person has been abused, neglected, exploited or abandoned, or is in a condition which
is the result of such abuse, neglect, exploitation or abandonment, . . . shall within five
calendar days report such information or cause a report to be made in any reasonable
manner ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-451(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). "Beginning Jan. 1, 1993 when
any ... minister,... has reasonable cause to believe that an in-home services client has been
abused or neglected, as a result of in-home services, he shall immediately report or cause a
report to be made to the department." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.300 (1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998);
"Reports must be made by the following persons who ... have reason to believe that an older
person is being or has been abused, neglected or exploited: ... Every clergyman .... " NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.5093 (1997 & Supp. 1997); "Any ... clergyman... having reasonable cause to
believe that an adult is being abused, neglected, or exploited ... shall immediately report such
belief to the county department of human services." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.61 (Ander-
son 1995 & Supp. 1998); "Any public or private official [which includes a clergyman] having
reasonable cause to believe that any person 65 years of age or older ... has suffered abuse ...
shall report or cause a report to be made .... OR. REV. STAT. § 124.050-60 (1996).
200. See DEL. CODE. ANN. § 3910(a) (1997). "Any person having reasonable cause to believe
that an adult person is infirm or incapacitated as defined in § 3902 of this title and is in need of
protective services as defined in § 3904 of this title shall report such information to the Depart-
ment of Health and Social Services." Id. "[A] person having cause to believe that an elderly ...
person is in a state of abuse, exploitation or neglect shall report .... " TEX. HUM. RES. CODE
ANN. § SW 48.036 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999). "An individual who believes or has reason to
believe that another individual is an endangered adult shall make a report under this chapter"
IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-9(a) (West 1994). See also Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030 (Banks-
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roles-as teachers, social workers, counselors, and education direc-
tors, for example-where secular professionals are specifically man-
dated to report. 201
Mandated reporting is not conditioned on actual knowledge of mal-
treatment, nor is clear and convincing evidence or a similarly elevated
evidentiary standard needed to trigger the duty.20 2 The statutory test
is objective-whether a prudent professional reasonably believes mis-
treatment has occurred based on the factual circumstances
presented. 20 3 Statutes with slightly different phrasing, e.g., calling for
reporting based on "suspicion" or "reasonable suspicion, '20 4 likewise
incorporate objective standards.205 Reasonable belief or suspicion
may be derived from the professional's personal observation, inter-
view, or information, or from other sources, including credible
hearsay.
The purpose of mandatory reporting is to bring suspected cases to
the attention of state authorities; once alerted, they can filter substan-
tiated cases of mistreatment from the unsubstantiated and trigger
ameliorative social and legal services. 20 6 Clergy have a unique oppor-
tunity to identify suspected elder abuse and neglect cases, because
Baldwin 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-47-7 (1993 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:46 (1994 & Supp. 1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 27-7-30 (Michie 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-102 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43A, § 10-104 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 71-6-103 (1995 & Supp. 1997); TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 505, TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 505; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-3-302 (1997 & Supp. 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-20-103 (Michie 1997).
201. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454 (West 1998). "A... psychologist, or social worker,
who has a reasonable basis to believe that abuse or neglect of the adult has occurred ... shall
immediately report or cause reports to be made ... ." Id. "Whenever any ... social worker,...
mental health professional, . . . has reasonable cause to suspect that an endangered adult has
been subjected to ... abuse, he shall immediately report or cause a report to be made in accord-
ance with the provisions of this section."ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-203(a)(1) (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1995).
202. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277-86 (1986) (requiring government to prove denatu-
ralization case by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence").
203. See statutes collected at supra notes 196-198 and accompanying text. See also Op. Mass.
Att'y Gen. 139, 140 (1974-75) (construing identically worded duty to report suspected child
abuse as not requiring documentation of abuse or neglect allegations; "reasonable cause" stan-
dard was intended to increase, not restrict, reporting).
204. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17(b)-451 (1997).
205. "Suspicion" is defined as having "a slight or even vague idea concerning" or "not neces-
sarily involving knowledge or belief or likelihood...." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1447 (6th ed.
1990). See also Op. Mass. Att'y Gen. 157 (1974-75) (equating "reasonable cause" to known and
"suspected" instances of child abuse and neglect).
206. APS agencies are "system[s] of preventive, supportive, and surrogate services for the
elderly living in the community to enable them to maintain independent living and avoid abuse
and exploitation." Robert E. Regan, Intervention Through Adult Protective Services Programs,
18 GERONTOLOGIST 250, 251 (1978).
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they administer institutions that tend to the varying needs of large
numbers of elderly Americans. Eighty percent of persons 65 and
older are members of a religious body207 and 56% say they attend
church weekly.20 8 When the religious affiliation percentages are com-
bined with the ever-increasing number of elderly in the United
States,20 9 a very large group of aged, church-going persons are at risk
for mistreatment. Clergy may gain information about suspected elder
abuse and neglect through a variety of sources. Personal observation
and/or conversation with the victim or the perpetrator may provide
direct evidence. Information may also emerge from other parishio-
ners, voluntary social, health, or educational church programs, or al-
lied public social agencies. Unfortunately, the available information
suggests that clergy and congregations are not taking advantage of
these unique opportunities, nor are they meeting their reporting
responsibilities. 210
The required report typically must be made to a state agency-usu-
ally Adult Protective Services ("APS") or law enforcement.21' States
also use central registries, a listing of abuse reports and information to
which only certain individuals may gain access. 212 These registries fa-
cilitate computerization of data, allowing rapid access to and retrieval
of relevant information and are particularly useful in states where
more than one agency is involved in the investigation and response to
mistreatment.
The content of the report usually includes names and addresses of
the allegedly abused citizen, the reporter, and the alleged abuser, as
well as information relating to the nature and the extent of the harm,
the basis of the reporter's knowledge. 213 The time frame for making
207. GALLUP, supra note 13, at 40-41.
208. Id. at 5.
209. The population segment comprised of persons age 65 and older more than doubled as a
proportion of total population between 1900 and 1987, and is expected to nearly double again
between 1985 and 2030. See AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJECrIONS, supra note 10. If
these trends continue as anticipated, by the turn of the century persons age 65 and over will
comprise 13% of the population, and by 2030 the percentage will rise to 21.8%. Id. at 3.
210. See infra notes 229-232 and accompanying text.
211. See GA. CODE ANN. 30-5-4(a)(2) (1997) (requiring that reports of elder abuse be directed
toward an "adult protection agency,... [or] an appropriate law enforcement authority or district
attorney").
212. See FLA. STAT. ch. 415.103(1) (1997) (requiring that a "central abuse registry" be estab-
lished to receive all reports of elder abuse).
213. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(D)(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). "All reports shall
contain the name and address of the adult, the name and address of the person responsible for
the care of the adult, if available, and any other pertinent information." Id.
Reports ... shall contain the name, address and approximate age of the elderly person
who is the subject of the report, information regarding the nature and extent of the
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such a report is delineated explicitly or through general description.214
Thereafter, investigation is commenced, followed by social services
and legal proceedings, if needed.2 15
While clergy often fear legal liability (e.g., tort suits for defamation
or violation of confidentiality) for reporting information regarding
elder abuse or neglect to public authorities, such fear is unfounded.
Under state statutes, those who report elder mistreatment receive va-
rying levels of immunity, including absolute immunity.2 16 The major-
ity provide immunity from liability if the report is made in "good
faith, ' 217 while others protect the reporter unless he acted "mali-
ciously," in "bad faith," or knew the report was false.218 Many states
abuse, the name of the person's caretaker, if known, any medical treatment being re-
ceived or immediately required, if known, any other information the reporter believes
to be relevant to the investigation, and the name and address of the reporter and where
said reporter may be contacted, if the reporter wishes to provide said information.
MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 19A, § 15(e) (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
214. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-206(a) (Michie 1997). "A report of abuse, sexual abuse, or
negligence of an abused or neglected adult may, pursuant to this chapter, be made by telephone
and shall be followed by a written report within forty-eight (48) hours, if so requested by the
receiving agency." Id. See also GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-8-82(a) (1997). "Such person shall also
make a written report to the Department of Human resources within 24 hours after making the
initial report." Id.
215. See TEX. CODE. ANN. § 48.061(b) (West Supp. 1998).
If the department determines that an elderly or disabled person is suffering from abuse,
exploitation, or neglect presenting a threat to life or physical safety, that the person
lacks capacity to consent to receive protective services, and that no consent can be
obtained, the department may petition the probate or statutory or constitutional county
court that has probate jurisdiction in the county in which the elderly or disabled person
resides for an emergency order authorizing protective services.
Id.
If an emergency exists, and the department, its designated agency, a member of the
immediate family or a caretaker has reasonable cause to believe that an elderly person
is suffering from abuse and lacks the capacity to consent to the provision of protective
services, said department, protective agency, member of the immediate family or care-
taker may petition the court for an emergency order of protective services.
MASS. GEN. LAWS AN,. ch. 19A, § 20(b) (West 1994).
216. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-9 (1992). "Any person, firm or corporation making... a report
pursuant to this chapter... shall in so doing be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that
might otherwise be incurred or imposed." Id. See also Jones v. Living Ctrs. Holding Co., 695 So.
2d 1194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). The Alabama statute confers absolute immunity for mandatory
reporters. Id.
217. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.120(a) (1996). "A person who in good faith makes a report
under AS 47.24.010, regardless of whether the person is required to do so, is immune from civil
or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed for making the report." Id.
218. See GA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-4 (1997). "Anyone who makes a report... shall be immune
from any civil or criminal liability ... unless such person acted in bad faith or with malicious
purpose." Id. See also IDAHO CODE § 39-5303(2) (Supp. 1997).
Any person who makes any report pursuant to this chapter, or who testifies in any
administrative or judicial proceding arising from such report .... shall be immune from
any civil or criminal liability on account of such report, testimony ... except that such
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
presume reports are made in good faith unless clear and convincing
evidence proves otherwise, 219 an important procedural protection.
Immunity is granted even where the report turns out to be
incorrect.22 0
In almost all states, anonymity is promised to those who report
elder mistreatment, 221 and breach of this guarantee of confidentiality
is grounds for liability. In Texas Department of Human Services v.
Benson,222 a church leader who had reported suspected child abuse to
the state Department of Human Services sued that department after it
disclosed his identity to the accused abusers.22 3 As a result of the dis-
closure, the suspected abusing parents filed a libel suit against both
Benson and his congregation.22 4 Though the libel suit was eventually
dismissed, Benson was fired from his clergy position and he then sued
The Department of Human Services. The trial jury found that the
state agency had negligently injured Benson,22 5 and the appellate
court affirmed that the department had violated its duty.2 26 The confi-
dentiality of the report, established by Texas law, was predicated on
the minister's parallel, absolute duty to report instances of child
abuse.22 7 The court described that duty as "sweeping and mak[ing] no
exception for clergy, physicians, mental health professionals or teach-
immunity shall not extend to perjury, reports made in bad faith or with malicious pur-
pose ....
Id. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-3-814 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-102 (1997).
219. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.1036 (West 1998).
Any person who participates in making a report under § 415.1034 or participates in a
judicial proceeding resulting therefrom is presumed to be acting in good faith and, un-
less lack of good faith is shown by clear and convincing evidence, is immune from any
liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might be incurred or imposed ....
Id.
220. See Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1997) (holding that there is no duty on
the part of mandatory reporters to accused abuser, because potential liability would discourage
reporting); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 NW. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (explaining that a physician not
liable to a patient for disclosing a contagious disease when the physician acts in good faith, even
if mistaken diagnosis made).
221. See ALASKA STAT. §47.24.050(a) (1996). "Investigation reports and reports of the aban-
donment, exploitation, abuse, neglect or self-neglect of a vulnerable adult filed under this chap-
ter are confidential and are not subject to public inspection and copying .... Id. "The reports
... shall be confidential and may be disclosed only as provided in subdivision (b). Any breach of
the confidentiality required by this chapter is a misdemeanor . . . . Subdivision (b) permits
disclosure to authorized persons and agencies responsible for investigation of the alleged abuse."
CAL. WELF. & INST. COE § 15634(a)-(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 1996).
222. 893 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
223. Id. at 238.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 243.
227. Id. at 241-42.
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ers."'228 Persons who made such reports in good faith were afforded
immunity from civil and criminal liability.229 In 1997, the Texas legisla-
ture amended its elder abuse reporting requirement to mandate re-
porting "without exception to a person whose communications are
generally confidential, including an attorney, clergy member, medical
practitioner, social worker, and mental health professional. ''230
D. Noncompliance with Mandatory Reporting
Despite the symbolic and practical importance of mandatory re-
porting statutes, noncompliance appears to be the rule. In 1991, ques-
tionnaires returned by all state agencies to Congress demonstrated
that a significant number of elder-abuse cases are never reported.231
The 1981 House of Representatives Report concluded that elder
abuse, although at least as prevalent as child abuse, is far less likely to
be reported.2 32
Under federal law, local agencies on aging must identify public and
private entities in their geographic areas that are engaged in the pre-
vention, identification, and treatment of elder abuse and neglect. 233
Workers in these agencies initiate and maintain face-to-face contacts
with seniors to assess cases and to advocate on behalf of the seniors.
A national survey examined these direct practice workers' perceptions
of fourteen occupational groups234 and their role in the discovery and
treatment of elder mistreatment. 235 The workers were asked to iden-
tify whether they had direct knowledge of cases uncovered by clergy
and other professionals and to rate the helpfulness of these groups in
identifying cases of elder abuse and neglect. 236 The results reflect a
228. Benson, 893 S.W.2d at 242.
229. Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.03 (West Supp. 1995)).
230. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.036(c) (1990 & Supp. 1999).
231. See ELDER ABUSE: WHAT CAN BE DONE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
HUMAN SERVICES OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 102D CONG. 42 (1991). See also
supra notes 184-190 and accompanying text.
232. 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8. The 1981 report issued by the House
Select Committee on Aging estimated that 4% of the American elderly population, approxi-
mately one million persons, may be victims of moderate to severe abuse, yet few cases are re-
ported. Id.
233. 42 U.S.C § 3018(a) (1994).
234. These groups include: visiting nurses, social service providers, agency homemakers, hos-
pital social workers, health aides, public welfare caseworkers, police, public health department
employees, mental health workers, physicians, emergency room staffs, clergy, nursing home per-
sonnel, and lawyers. Id.
235. B. E. Blakely & R. Dolon, The Relative Contributions of Occupation Groups in the Dis-
covery and Treatment of Elder Abuse and Neglect, 17 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK. 183, 189-
94 (1991).
236. Id.
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deeply negative view of the help provided by these groups. In particu-
lar, clergy were ranked between "not very helpful" and "no help at
all" in the discovery of elder abuse and neglect.2 37 As original referral
sources, clergy ranked 12th (of 14) regarding elder abuse, and 11th for
neglect.2 38 Only 9.6% of those who had encountered abuse reported
first-hand knowledge of at least one referral by clergy.2 39 Clergy were
perceived to be even less effective in treating abuse and neglect than
in uncovering it.240 Ten years later, Professors Blakely and Dolon
conducted an even more comprehensive survey to determine the rat-
ings of the amount of help provided by various occupational groups in
detecting and treating elder abuse and neglect as judged by these
front-line workers.2 41 This time clergy were ranked last, of seventeen
professional and nonprofessional groups, in both detection and
treatment.2 42
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES TO CLERGY WHO FAIL
TO REPORT
While failure to report suspected elder abuse and neglect is often a
criminal violation,243 most statutes require an elevated mental stan-
dard-often "willful" '244 or "knowing" 245-in order to constitute a
crime. This mental standard is difficult to prove, and the lack of re-
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 189, 193.
241. Blakely & Dolan, supra note 235, at 183, 189, 193.
242. B.E. Blakely & Ronald Dolon, The Relationship Between Adult Protective Services and
the Criminal Justice System: A National Study (unpublished paper presented at the Fourth An-
nual Conference on Children Exposed to Family Violence, Oct. 1998) (on file with authors).
243. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-454(J) (West 1997) ("A person who violates any provi-
sion of this section is guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor."); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15634(d)
(West 1991 & Supp. 1996) ("Any person who fails to report an instance of elder or dependent
adult abuse, as required by this article, is guilty of a misdemeanor ...."); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-3-302.5(4) (1997) ("A person who is required to report suspected ... abuse, neglect, or
exploitation of a disabled or elder adult ... and who willfully fails to do so, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor"). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-334 (1995 & Supp 1996); TEXAS HUM. RE-
SOURCE CODE 48.036 (1990 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6913(e) (1991 & Supp.
1996).
244. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-302.5(4) (1997) ("A person who is required to report
suspected ... abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a disabled or elder adult ... and who willfully
fails to do so, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor" (emphasis added)). "Any person who know-
ingly and willfully fails to report as provided by Subsection C, shall be fined ... or imprisoned
... or both." Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(J)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-334 (1995 & Supp 1996); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 33, § 6913(e) (1991 & Supp. 1996).
245. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(J)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); TEXAS HUM. RE-
SOURCE CODE 48.036 (1990 & Supp. 1999).
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porting makes prosecution almost unknown.246 Moreover, prosecutors
are generally loathe to indict the clergy, especially those acting under
religious conscience.
A more realistic fear, however, is the spector of civil liability of the
clergyperson, the individual church, or its organized body. When
clergy learn, or have reason to believe, that a senior citizen is being
mistreated but do not report that information to APS and the abuse
continues with attendant and increasing injury to the victim, serious
monetary risks ensue. The senior, or more likely a subsequently ap-
pointed guardian, may bring a negligence action maintaining that the
subsequent abuse and injury would not have occurred had the
clergyperson complied with the statute and/or his duty of care. The
actual abuser is, of course, liable to the victim under numerous tort
theories-battery, negligence, etc.-or to criminal prosecution.247 But
246. A Westlaw search of state cases from 1986 to present did not reveal a single case in which
a person was prosecuted for a failure to report elder abuse as required by statute.
247. Abuse, neglect and financial exploitation of older persons have been made specific
crimes in almost all states. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ArN. § 71-6-117 (1995). "It is unlawful for any
person to willfully abuse, neglect or exploit any adult within the meaning of the provisions of this
part. Any person who willfully abuses, neglects or exploits a person in violation of the provisions
of this part commits a Class A misdemeanor." WYo. STAT. ANN. 35-20-109 (Michie 1997) ("A
person who abuses, neglects, exploits or abandons a disabled adult is guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars [$1000.00]). Statutes
often make serious physical abuse or neglect a separate offense. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § 13K(e) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
Whoever, being a caretaker ... permits serious bodily injury to such elder or person
with a disability, or wantonly or recklessly permits another to commit an assault and
battery upon such elder ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
not more than ten years or... in the house of correction for not more than two and
one-half years ....
Id. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3913 (1997) (intentional abuse causing bodily harm,
permanent disfigurement is a Class D felony); Ky. REV. STAT. ArN. § 209.990 (Banks-Baldwin
1997) (knowing and willful abuse causing serious physical or mental injury is Class C felony).
States which do not specifically criminalize abuse and neglect often have provisions requiring
reports go to police for criminal investigation. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A, § 18(a)
(1994).
If an assessment results in a determination that the elderly person has suffered serious
abuse, the department or designated agency shall report such determination to the dis-
trict attorney of the county where the abuse occurred within forty-eight hours. The
district attorney may investigate and decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings.
Id. See also CorN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-460 (West 1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-5310 (Supp.
1997).
Most states allow the advanced age of a victim to be considered as an aggravating factor in
sentencing because of the vulnerability to crime of older persons as well as the enhanced effect
that crime has on them. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.167 (1-2) (Michie 1997) ("Certain
crimes committed against persons 65 years of age or older.., shall be punished by imprisonment
... for a term equal to and in addition to the term of imprisonment prescribed by statute for the
crime"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(13) (West 1997) (enhancing culpability "[i]f the victim
of the offense is sixty-five or more years of age or is a handicapped person"); DEL. CODE. ANN.
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the abuser may, at the time of the civil action, be unavailable, judg-
ment-proof, or for other reasons, an unappealing defendant. In such
an instance, clergy or the church may become the target of a negli-
gence suit. Four traditional elements comprise a negligence cause of
action: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. These will be
discussed in order.
A. Negligence Liability
1. Duty & Breach
The duty issue determines whether the clergyperson owes an obli-
gation to the injured, in this case the maltreated aged person. Duty is
a legal question which must be decided by the judge, not the jury.248
In determining whether to impose a duty, courts engage in a complex
analysis that weighs and balances several related factors: the foresee-
ability and severity of the underlying risk of harm, the opportunity
and ability to exercise care to prevent that harm, the comparative in-
terest of the relationships between or among the parties, and ulti-
mately considerations of public policy and fairness. 249 Foreseeability
includes the defendant's reasonable knowledge of the risk and the
specific plaintiff likely to suffer a particular type of injury.250 When a
third person poses the risk of harm, the plaintiff may be required to
prove that the clergyperson was in a position to "know or have reason
tit. 11 § 841(c)(2) (Supp. 1996) (enhancing liability if the "victim is 60 years of age or older"); 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4)(ii) (West 1997) (augmenting punishment if the victim is
"a person 60 years of age or older at the time of the offense").
Other states designate various crimes, including assault, battery, robbery, etc. as more serious
offenses when committed against an elderly person. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.08(2) (West
1997 & Supp. 1998).
Whenever a person is charged with committing an assault or aggravated assault or a
battery or aggravated battery upon a person 65 years of age or older, regardless of
whether he or she knows or has reason to know the age of the victim, the offense for
which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
(a) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a felony
of the first degree.
(b) In the case of aggravated assault, from a felony of the third degree to a felony of
the second degree.
(c) In the case of battery, from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the
third degree).
Id.
248. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37, 235-36
(5th ed. 1984).
249. Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993).
250. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E.99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing whether the risk
was one that should have been "reasonably perceived"). Later, the New York Court of Appeals
phrased the question as whether the factual and legal links between the parties meant that the
plaintiff was within the defendant's "range of apprehension." Id.
WHEN SILENCE RESOUNDS
to know that there was likelihood of conduct on the part of the third
person that would result in the damage. 251
The early common law drew a clear distinction between misfea-
sance (action) and nonfeasance (inaction).
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and
more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-fea-
sance, between active misconduct working positive injury to others
and passive in action [sic], a failure to take positive steps to benefit
others, or to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful
act of the defendant.252
Courts have long recognized an exception to the traditional rule,
which imposed no affirmative duty to act, where a special relationship
existed between the parties. 253 Illustrative examples include common
carriers and their passengers, 254 innkeepers and guests,2 55 landholders
and invitees.256 If a special relationship is found to exist between a
clergyperson and a victim of elder mistreatment, that victim is owed a
duty by the clergyperson to take reasonable steps to report and/or
deal with the problem. This principle is illustrated by several child
abuse cases. In JAW v. Roberts,2 57 an Indiana appellate court recog-
nized that clergy may have a special relationship with a parishioner
where a "level of interaction or dependency [exists] between the par-
ties that surpasses what is common or usual." 258 No liability was im-
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1965).
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one
of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negli-
gent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for
harm caused thereby.
Id.
252. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U.
PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 248, at 373; MARSHALL S.
SHAPo, THE Du'Y TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY (1977) (describing "no duty
to rescue" principle as based on moral vision of individualism and autonomy).
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 251, at § 315.
254. See Werndli v. Grayhound Corp., 365 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that a bus driver had a duty to warn a passenger who wished to disembark that the area was
known for its frequent criminal activity and its danger). See also Lopez v. Southern California
Rapid Transit District, 710 P.2d 907 (Cal. 1985).
255. Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 899 P.2d 393 (Haw. 1995).
256. Virginia M. Chock & Leslie H. Kondo, Note, Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc.:
Imposing a Duty to Protect Against Third Party Criminal Conduct on the Premises, 11 HAW. L.
REV. 231, 248 (1989); Michael Paul Thomas, Premises Liability for Criminal Acts, CAL. LAWYER
48 (1997).
257. 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). A child who had been molested sued several de-
fendants, including clergy, who knew about the continuing abuse but did nothing to intervene.
Id.
258. Id. at 809.
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posed on the clergyperson in this instance because the court deemed
the interaction and dependence insufficient. 259
In contrast, a Washington appellate court in Funkhowser v. Wil-
son260 imposed liability on a lay church leader who knew of a church
official's proclivity for sexual molestation and did nothing to prevent
it. The defendant was responsible for children in various church pro-
grams.261 Schulz, a church leader involved in youth activities, was in-
formed that Wilson had molested children in the past and might pose
a danger to children at the church. Schulz was also aware that Wilson
had access to the pastor's daughters, but he took no action. 262 Wilson
subsequently molested all three of the pastor's daughters. The court
stated:
Ultimately, whether a "special" relationship giving rise to a legal
duty exists involves the balancing of the societal interests involved,
the severity of the risk, the burden upon the defendant, the likeli-
hood of occurrence, the relationship between the parties, the temp-
tation presented by the act or failure to act, the gravity of the harm
that may result, and the possibility that some other person will as-
sume the responsibility for preventing the conduct or the harm, to-
gether with the burden of the precautions which the actor would be
required to take.263
The court found that a rational trier of fact could find that such a
special relationship existed in this instance. 264
The mandatory elder abuse reporting statutes, which typically pro-
vide criminal sanctions for violation, should establish a legal duty for
negligence purposes where the legislature has required "every citizen"
or specific groups, e.g., clergy, to notify public authorities of possible
mistreatment. The purpose of the reporting statute is usually explic-
itly stated:
The purpose of this Section is to protect adults who cannot physi-
cally or mentally protect themselves and who are harmed or
threatened with harm through action or inaction by themselves or
by the individuals responsible for their care or by other parties, by
requiring mandatory reporting of suspected cases of abuse or ne-
glect by any person having reasonable cause to believe that such a
case exists. It is intended that, as a result of such reports, protective
services shall be provided by the adult protection agency.265
259. Id. at 813.
260. 950 P.2d 501 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 504-05.
263. Id. at 509.
264. Id. at 510.
265. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.2A(1) (West 1998).
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Moreover, a civil cause of action for failing to report suspected elder
abuse or neglect as required by law has been created by statute in four
states: Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan and Minnesota.266
Once a legal relationship between the clergyperson and the abused
elder has been recognized, the court must evaluate the reasonableness
of the defendant's behavior. Under the oft-cited test formulated by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing,267 the "bur-
den of adequate precautions" is balanced against the probability that
the injury will occur multiplied by the severity of the injury if it oc-
curs.268 Judge Hand explained this as a mathematical formula:
"[Lliability depends on whether B [the burden of adequate precau-
tions] is less than L [the potential injury] multiplied by P [the
probability of inury]; i.e., whether B<PL.' ' 269 If the minister's knowl-
edge of the risk and the action needed to eliminate the risk are out-
weighed by the probability and severity of the injury, the action or
inaction would be found unreasonable. 270
Applying this test to the clergy reporting and elder abuse context,
the time and other burdens on the minister to evaluate information
and report to APS would, in many situations, not outweigh society's
interest in protecting the aged from abuse. The particular facts in-
volved would, of course, be critical: would a reasonable person have
inquired further into the situation? Initiated a visit to the site? Noti-
fied public authorities of the information?
The vast majority of elderly victims fall prey to a close relative or a
care-taker, and the mistreatment is committed either in the home of
the offender or the victim. 271 The family ties and isolation of many
266. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-202(b) (Michie 1997) ("Any person or caregiver required by this
chapter to report a case of suspected abuse, neglect, or exploitation who purposely fails to do so
shall be civilly liable for damages proximately caused by the failure."). See also IOWA CODE
§ 235B.3(10) (1998) ("A person required by this section to report a suspected case of dependent
adult abuse who knowingly fails to do so is civilly liable for the damages proximately caused by
the failure."); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 16.411e(1) (1997) ("A person required to make a report
pursuant to §11a who fails to do so is liable civilly for the damages proximately caused by the
failure to report, and a civil fine of not more than $500.00 for each failure to report"); MINN.
STAT. § 626.557(7) (1997) ("A mandated reporter who negligently or intentionally fails to report
is liable for damages caused by the failure.").
267. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Essentially the same analysis is performed by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 251, at §§ 291-93. The RESTATEMENT test also
measures the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct by weighing its risks against its utility.
Id.
271. National Elder Abuse Incidence Study, Conclusions, supra note 143, at 4. Approximately
90% of alleged abusers were related to victims. Id.
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elders make self-reporting unlikely.2 72 Given these factors, clergy are
in a unique position to learn of abuse and neglect, and indeed, they
may be the only people with the kind of knowledge or opportunity to
know that a particular individual is being abused.273 The duty im-
posed on them to act is therefore appropriate. Foreseeability is often
based upon "particular knowledge" or "special reason to know" that
an individual would suffer a "particular type of injury. '2 74 The stat-
utes, however, reflect the legislative judgment that while confidential-
ity serves a public purpose, "the protective privilege ends where the
public peril begins." 275
If the minister fails to recognize reasonably ascertainable abuse, or
learns of it and fails to report, a breach of the duty has occurred. For
many years various religious bodies have proclaimed their commit-
ment to oppose domestic violence, published materials and conducted
training seminars on the various aspects of this topic.2 76 The United
States Catholic Conference notes that its commitment to advocacy
against domestic violence is "rooted in a concern for human life,
human dignity, and family life... [and that] [h]istorically, in its role as
sanctuary, the Church has protected those in danger. 12 77 While edu-
cation and community mobilization are important roles for clergy, one
of their most important functions is to respond supportively and ap-
propriately when approached by victims, perpetrators, or third par-
ties.2 78 The Center for the Prevention of Sexual and Domestic
Violence trains and develops materials for clergy and lay leaders
[t]o increase [their] awareness of the nature and extent of violence
in the family ... [t]o increase participants' skills in responding to
victims and abusers in order to stop the abuse ... [t]o increase par-
ticipants' skills in responding to the religious concerns of victims
272. See supra notes 184-190 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
274. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (imposing duty of
reasonable care under circumstances when defendant has basis for determining a readily identifi-
able victim is likely to be harmed by the actions of a third person).
275. Id. at 347.
276. See U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE OFFICE OF DOMESTIC SOCIAL DEV., VIOLENCE IN THE
FAMILY: A NATIONAL CONCERN, A CHURCH CONCERN (1979) (describing the Catholic Church's
response to domestic violence). See also James L. Franklin, Clergy Vows New Support for Vic-
tims of Battering, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1993, at 1 (explaining that religious groups are trying
to break down any unintended message that religion or the Bible tolerates abuse); Darrell Hol-
land, Diocese Holds Seminars for Church Workers, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 15, 1994, at 8E (describ-
ing church programs designed to assist those working for the church with respect to domestic
violence); Linda Midgett, Silent Screams: Are Evangelists Responding Effectively to Abused
Women? CHRISTIANITY TODAY, July 19, 1993, at 44-45.
277. See U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 276, at 1.
278. See MARIE M. FORTUNE, VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY: A WORKSHOP CURRICULUM FOR
CLERGY AND OTHER HELPERS 19 (1991).
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and abusers ... [and] to increase cooperation between the religious
and secular communities in response to spouse abuse.2 79
Numerous analogous situations involve the failure of a professional
to reveal to a third party a foreseeable danger to the plaintiff. Often
these cases are based on statutory duties to report to public agen-
cies specific conditions creating risk.280 Other cases involve affir-
mative obligations imposed to reveal even confidential information
in order to protect an identifiable third party from harm.281 The
clergy-elder abuse situation is analogous; the burden on the clergy-
person of triggering the protective instrumentalities is minimal-
they simply must notify the appropriate public authorities. 282 Clergy
are likely to have close relationships with the individuals involved
and will often have concrete, or at least credible, evidence of past
and continuing harm.28 3 If a minister should have identified elder
mistreatment, or learned of the abuse or neglect through counseling
or from other sources, a duty to forestall future harm by triggering
a public agency response is created. 284 The minister has no legal
responsibility to control the actions of the abuser or rectify the situa-
tion.285
2. Causation
Once a plaintiff has demonstrated that the clergyperson had a duty
and breached it, she must prove the logical link-both factual and
legal (proximate) cause-between her injuries and the minister's ac-
tions.2 86 A defendant will typically argue that the harm to the plaintiff
emanated from the perpetrator's tortious and criminal behavior, not
279. Id. at 45.
280. See Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984) (physician may be found
liable for failing to warn patient's family and others likely to be exposed to patient of nature and
danger of exposure).
281. Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976) (imposing liability on doctor for failure to
notify child protective services of battered child as required by state law).
282. See supra notes 191-225 and accompanying text.
283. Franklin, supra note 276, at 1 (noting that "clergy may be the first or only counselors to
whom abused women may turn"); Rebecca Frey, The Powerlessness of God: Sacramental Minis-
try to Survivors of Abuse, 24 LUTHERAN F. 18, 22 (1990) (discussing the emotional and cognitive
dislocation often experienced by victims of domestic abuse).
284. See Timothy E. Gammon & John K. Hulston, The Duty of Mental Health Care Providers
to Restrain Their Patients or Warn Third Parties, 60 Mo. L. REV. 749 (1995); Peter F. Lake,
Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97 (1994). See also Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 308
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (listing cases approving Tarasoff result); Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield
Family Counseling Center, 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997) (finding that psychiatrist-outpatient
relationship justifies duty to protect third parties); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis.
1988) (holding that psychiatrist had duty to tell police of patient's dangerousness).
285. Id.
286. KEETON ET AL., supra note 248, at 263.
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the cleric's. Once a duty exists and is breached, however, if the
clergyperson fails to respond, causation may be found despite the ille-
gal nature of the subsequent abuse or neglect by the perpetrator.2 87
Intervening negligent and/or criminal acts-in this instance by a rela-
tive, care-taker or others-that the defendant might reasonably antici-
pate do not supersede or cut off the defendant's liability for his own
act or omission. 288 It has been noted, "[i]f the likelihood that a third
person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the
hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether inno-
cent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby. '289 The subsequent
damage may be viewed as the exact harm the reporting laws were
designed to prevent and thus do not supercede the defendant's
liability.290
In weighing that liability, courts are likely to note that considerable
empirical evidence supports the conclusion that elder mistreatment is
rarely an isolated event.291 Elder abuse, like spouse and child abuse,
often follows cyclical patterns, with the victim being mistreated re-
peatedly-and with increasing severity.292 "Mistreatment is likely to
escalate in frequency and severity over time .... The long-term tra-
jectory of abuse is such that if intervention is not initiated after abuse
is first observed... , the chances are good that it will continue. '293
The dynamics are often similar to that found in partner abuse. There,
the perpetrator may begin with psychological or financial abuse, pro-
gress to property or pet destruction, and finally to physical assault.294
Elder mistreatment may follow this "cycle of violence," or take differ-
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 251, at § 449.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Stevens v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 528 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Iowa 1995)
(finding schools liable for injury to student caused by criminal attack of another student because
schools had negligently failed to supervise a student with known violent tendencies).
291. American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, Elder Abuse & Neglect, 257
JAMA 966-71 (1987).
292. H. O'MALLEY ET AL., LEGAL RESEARCH AND SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY, ELDER
ABUSE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A SURVEY OF PROFESSIONALS AND PARAPROFESSIONALS (1979)
(estimating 70% of reported cases involved repeated instances of abuse); Elder Abuse & Neglect,
supra note 291, at 966-70.
293. Lorin A. Baumbover & S. Colleen Beall, Prognosis: Elder Mistreatment in Health Care
Settings, in ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS: STRATEGIES FOR As.
SESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 241, 248 (Loren A. Baumhover & S. Colleen Beall eds., 1996).
294. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 42-47 (1989) (describing the cycle
of violence).
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ent paths, resulting in violation of the aged person's civil rights, physi-
cal violence, or other damage. 295
The widespread adoption of reporting statutes demonstrates that
legislatures presumed and anticipated cyclical behavior. Therefore,
once a minister suspects or has reason to believe that an older person
has suffered abuse or neglect, he should also reasonably anticipate
repetition or escalation. Mandatory reporting states reflect recogni-
tion that elders are protected only by identifying those at risk, and
instituting protective and therapeutic measures. The ameliorative sys-
tems, however, will not work unless they are triggered. In many in-
stances, the consequences of the failure to report are quite forseeable:
public authorities will not act, and the abuse will continue.
If the factfinder concludes that the defendant's inaction was at least
a "substantial factor" that increased the risk of the subsequent harm,
"in fact" causation may be established. 296 This principle underlies
analogous cases charging a care-taker-usually a parent-with crimi-
nal liability for failure to report child abuse.297 Again, the actual phys-
ical or other harm is inflicted by a third person, typically the husband
or boyfriend. 298 But the plaintiff must also prove the clergy inaction
was the "proximate cause" of the abuse.299 The well-known Landeros
v. Flood3 °° case confronted this issue in a malpractice action against a
physician who returned a child to parents who later beat the child
repeatedly, causing permanent damage. 301 The doctor's failure to di-
agnose "battered child syndrome" and to report it was held to be the
proximate cause of the injuries.30 2 Clergy may likewise be held liable
for harm that occurs after failure to act to prevent foreseeable risk.
Recognizing this cause of action promotes the legislative policy of en-
couraging compliance with the reporting statutes and preventing elder
295. Id.
296. See Wisconsin v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Wis. 1986).
297. Id.
298. Id. (concluding that mother's failure to report to state authorities where she knew of
abuse and left children alone with father was "substantial factor" which increased the risk of
subsequent mistreatment).
299. Judge Andrews defined proximate cause as "[w]hat we mean by the word 'proximate' is
that, because of convenience, of public policy, or a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162
N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928).
300. 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 395. The court relied on RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 449 to support its conclusion.
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mistreatment. Damages may, of course, be apportioned between two
or more defendants, and the minister may implead the abuser.30 3
B. Vicarious and Ascending Liability
In some cases, a court may impose liability on one party because of
the wrongful or harmful activity of another. Vicarious liability may
arise when a principal or employer is held liable for the conduct of an
agent or employee or when a joint tortfeasor is involved. In such a
case, one party is vicariously liable for the actionable conduct of an-
other, based solely on the relationship that exists between the two
parties. 304
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,30 5 an employer or princi-
pal is held liable for the actions of his employee or agent. 306 The pub-
lic policy behind the doctrine is that, when a person is conducting
business through others, that person is bound to manage them so as to
avoid harm to third parties. 30 7 Thus, the doctrine allows a court to
find some other entity that has benefitted from the harmful action and
place responsibility on that entity.308 When an agent or employee fails
to exercise due care, the principal or employer is responsible to those
the agent or employee owed a duty of care, assuming that the ser-
vant's failure occurred during the course of his employment.30 9 The
employer is responsible for harm that results from the conduct of a
servant that was within the scope of the servant's employment 310 or
within the legitimate scope of the agent's authority.311 To impose vi-
carious liability on an organization, the organization must have exer-
303. See IND. TRIAL 14. "A defending party, as a third party plaintiff, may cause a summons
and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to
him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Nikolous v. Superior Court, 756 P.2d 925
(Ariz. 1988) (holding that the defendant, who was in an auto accident with the plaintiff, could
implead the city because it was alleged that a fire truck negligently caused the accident and the
city may ultimately be liable to the defendant); Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. Just, 191
S.E.2d 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that a physician sued for prescribing the wrong drug
could implead a drug manufacturer because the physician claimed that the drugs were unsafe
and not fit for the intended use).
304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §219 (1958).
305. The term "respondeat superior" means "let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 205, at 1311.
306. Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Govro, 407 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969).
307. See Brillhart v. Scheier, 758 P.2d 219, 222 (Kan. 1988); see also John R. v. Oakland Uni-
fied School Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 954 (Cal. 1989) (en banc).
308. Id.
309. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 85 S.w.2d 829, 832 (Tex. Ct. App.
1935).
310. Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers, 267 P.2d 568, 571 (Okla. 1954).
311. Rogers v. Town of Black Mountain, 29 S.E.2d 203, 205 (N.C. 1944).
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cised control over or benefitted from the wrongful conduct, and the
injury must have occurred while the relationship existed between the
organization and the servant.312 Stated differently, the organization
must have ordered, participated in, or ratified the misconduct.
Courts frequently use the doctrine of respondeat superior in award-
ing compensatory damages, thus making the employer or principal fi-
nancially responsible for the torts of its servants. However, courts
have also applied the doctrine when awarding punitive damages. 313
Most courts will hold the master liable for punitive damages when the
servant has acted within the scope of employment, the servant has
acted maliciously, and the master is vicariously liable for actual dam-
ages.314 With this majority approach, courts hold the master vicari-
ously liable for the malicious conduct of servants in order to deter
such wrongful behavior and to encourage masters to exercise greater
control over their servants.315
The Restatement of Torts316 and the Restatement of Agency 31 7 take
another approach that limits the vicarious liability for punitive dam-
ages to certain situations. First, the plaintiff may not recover punitive
damages unless the master, actually 31 8 or impliedly,31 9 authorized the
performance and manner of the act. Second, the master had to have
been reckless in employing a servant that was unfit. 320 In this situa-
312. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 251, at § 909.
313. See DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES 214 (1973).
314. See Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990);
Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 647 P.2d 629 (Ariz. 1982); Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn,
452 P.2d 117 (Ariz. App. 1969); Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869); Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Lawrence, 22 So. 53 (Miss. 1897); Taxicab Criver's Local Union No. 889 v. Pittman,
322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1957); Al Parker Buick v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App. 1990). But see
Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th
Cir. 1923); Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 194 P.2d 281 (Idaho 1948); Rickman
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 227 P.2d 607 (Mont. 1951); Gates v. St. James Operating Co., 7 A.2d 632
(N.J. 1939).
315. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 248, at 13.
316. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 251, at § 909.
317. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 304, at § 217C.
318. See Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 609-10 (1887).
319. See, e.g., Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990); Templin v. Mountain Bell Tel, Co.,
643 P.2d 263 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Dart Drug, Inc. v. Linthicum, 300 A.2d 442 (D.C. 1973);
Robinson v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 447 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. App. 1984).
320. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopters Textrron, 805 F.2d 907 (10th
Cir. 1986); Holben v. Midwest Emery Freight Sus., 525 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Pa. 1981); MV. v.
Gulf Ridge Council Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 529 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. App. 1988); Preventive
Sec. & Investigators, Inc. v. Troge, 423 So. 2d 931 (Fla. App. 1982); Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d
858 (Iowa 1983); Girardi v. Community Hosp., 525 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1988); Boyd v. L.G. DeWitt
Trucking Co., 405 S.E.2d 914 (N.C. App. 1991); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Davis, 582 S.W.2d
191 (Tex. App. 1979); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Marvin Riggs Co., 584 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.
1979); Condict v. Condict, 664 P.2d 131 (Wyo. 1983).
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tion, the master has actually acted wrongfully. 321 Third, the servant
had to have been acting in a managerial capacity and within the scope
of employment.322 Fourth, the master may be vicariously liable for
punitive damages when the master or one of the master's managerial
officers participates in, approves of, or ratifies the servant's acts.323
Religious organizations may also be held vicariously liable under a
related theory of liability. With the demise of charitable immunity,
religious organizations are exposed to liability for the harm that they
cause to others. However, religious organizations 324 may also be held
responsible for the conduct of members, employees, agents, or even
another related religious organization and its members, employees, or
agents.325 This theory of liability is ascending liability. 326 With as-
cending liability, a party who is injured by an organization's employ-
ees or agents or a related, but separate, organization's employees or
agents seeks to place responsibility for the harm on another organiza-
tion.327 With religious organizations that are related to each other ec-
321. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 251, at § 909 (stating that "[iut is,
however, within the general spirit of the rule to make liable an employer who has recklessly
employed or retained a servant or employee who was known to be vicious, if the harm resulted
from that characteristic").
322. See Mr. Furniture v. Barclays American/Commercial, Inc., 919 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1990);
Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1985); Protectus Alpha Nav. Co. v. North Pac. Grain
Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985); Pirre v. Printing Dev., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979); Pier 66 Co. v. Poulos, 542 So. 2d 377 (Fla. App.
1989); Kent Ins. Co. v. Schroeder, 469 So. 2d 209 (Fla. App. 1985); Deal v. Byford, 537 N.E.2d
(I11. 1989); Abshire v. Stoller, 601 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. 1992); Freeman v. Bonnes Trucking,
Inc., 337 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 1983); Mistich v. Pipelines, Inc., 609 So. 2d 921 (La. App. 1992);
Olson v. Tri-County State Bank, 456 N.W.2d 132 (S.D. 1990); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Ramos, 784
S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990); Delta Drilling Co. v. Cruz, 707 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App. 1986); Purvis v.
Holiday Inn, Inc., 588 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App. 1979), rev'd, 595 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1980).
323. See City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Inc., 982 F.2d 1086 (7th
Cir. 1992); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Stamps, 920 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir. 1990);
Barhonovich v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1991); Muratore v. MIS Scotia
Prince, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1988); Bulgo v. Munoz, 853 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1988); Martin v.
Texaco, Inc., 726 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1984); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Aguila, 389 So. 2d 303 (Fla.
1980); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Worthy, 447 So. 2d 998 (Fla. App. 1984); Ballard v. Bird, 405
N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. 1980); Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 666 P.2d 711 (Kan. 1983);
Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. 1991); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Reeves, 578
S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
324. This increased exposure to risk from the harm caused by another involves both religious
nonprofit corporations and unincorporated religious associations. See Mark E. Chopko, Ascend-
ing Liability of Religious Entities for the Actions of Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 289, 294-96
(1993).
325. Id. at 289.
326. See EDWARD M. GAFFNEY, JR. & PHILIP C. SORENSEN, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELI-
GIOUS AND OTHER NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (Howard C. Griffen ed., 1984); RICHARD R.
HAMMAR, PASTOR, CHURCH & LAW (2d ed. 1991); Chopko, supra note 324, at 289.
327. Chopko, supra note 324, at 292 (defining "ascending liability" as the effort by injured
parties to place responsibility on one organization for the damage or the debt caused by that
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clesially or hierarchically, the allocation of civil responsibility may
follow the ecclesial or hierarchical lines until the responsibility finally
resides in the entity that "has both the juridic power and the civil duty
to answer for the actions of individuals or organizations at a lower
level. '328 Courts employ this doctrine to place the civil responsibility
for injury on a financially responsible defendant. 329 However, the
doctrine also serves to utilize the liability system to enforce some
greater responsibility on related organizations. 330 Most of the re-
ported litigation regarding ascending liability and religious organiza-
tions has occurred within the last ten years.331
Liability will ascend when responsibility is allocated according to
one of the following three principles: (1) statutory or corporate re-
sponsibility; (2) denominational responsibility; or (3) situational re-
sponsibility.332 First, liability may ascend to a coordinate or superior
body when that body, in the corporation's civil governing documents,
articles of incorporation, bylaws, policy or personnel manuals, or simi-
lar documents, reserves authority over the matter in contention.333
Second, liability may also ascend when a superior or coordinate or-
ganization has reserved authority over the matter in dispute in its ec-
clesial documents or its expressions of authority.334 Third, the
doctrine of ascending liability may apply when the conduct of the or-
ganization has so insinuated or involved itself in the matter in conten-
tion that the organization can rightly be held as a defendant in the
action. 335
Thus, as a general rule, courts may hold organizations fully liable,
including for punitive damages, when their employees or agents cause
harm, regardless of the culpability of the organization. 336 Some juris-
organization's employees or agents, or by a related but separate organization's employees or
agents).
328. Id. at 294-95. Chopko notes that ascending liability is clearly found in litigation that
involves hierarchical churches, thus placing responsibility on "superior" religious organizations.
Id. at 295. However, courts also use the doctrine to hold "coordinate" religious organizations
responsible for the actions of religious organizations that are non-hierarchical, that is, congrega-
tional. Id. Such liability allocation in this instance would appear to be more horizontal than
vertical or ascending. Id.
329. Id. at 293.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 297. The first case involving ascending liability occurred in 1979. See Barr v.
United Methodist Church, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
332. For a discussion of these three principles, see id.
333. Chopko, supra note 324, at 300-03.
334. Id. at 303-07.
335. Id. at 308-09.
336. See Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 176 So. 332 (Ala. 1937); Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn,
452 P.2d 117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); Miller v. Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293 (Ark. 1948); American
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dictions have modified this rule so that a court will not hold organiza-
tions vicariously liable for punitive damages except when the
organization ratified or authorized the tortious act of the employee or
agent or when the organization bore some degree of culpability in re-
lation to the tortious act.337
V. LEGAL PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO CLERGY
A. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege338
The law generally assumes that parties in litigation have the right to
obtain and produce evidence from all sources.339 Privileges bar cer-
tain testimony at trial, or protect certain witnesses from compulsory
participation in trial. 340 The interests protected by a privilege are
deemed more important than the trial's search for truth.341 To be
privileged, a communication must have been made and maintained in
confidence. 342 Any voluntary disclosure generally acts as a waiver.343
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Farmer, 48 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948); Northrup v. Miles Homes,
Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1973); D.L. Fair Lumber Co. v. Weems, 16 So. 2d 770 (Miss. 1944);
Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Schmidt v. Minor, 184 N.W. 964
(Minn. 1921); Clemmons v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 163 S.E.2d 761 (N.C. 1968); Stroud v.
Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790 (Or. 1975); Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526 (Tenn. 1974).
337. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (West Supp. 1984); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying New York law).
338. The privilege of a clergyperson not to testify about privileged communications has been
known by different names throughout its history. The privilege has been called "priest-
penitent," "confessor," "clergyman's," "minister's," etc. For the purposes of this article, the
terms "clergy-penitent privilege," "clergy-parishioner privilege," "minister's privilege," "clergy's
privilege," or simply "the privilege" all refer to the right of a clergyperson of any denomination
to remain silent and refuse testimony.
339. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (courts and the public have a right to
"every man's evidence before a grand jury except for those persons protected by a constitu-
tional, common-law or statutory privilege").
340. Without the protection of a recognized privilege, punishment for contempt of court may
be imposed on a witness who refuses to testify. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
341. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) ("We do not create
and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it 'promotes sufficiently important interests to out-
weigh the need for probative evidence."') (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)). See also David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110 (1956) (it is "historic judgment of the common
law" that "whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by recognition of the
privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative relations").
342. See Dean Wigmore's first two requirements for recognizing a privilege, quoted infra note
345. See also United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1971) (where a letter to a priest con-
tained no hint that its contents were to be kept secret, or that its purpose was to obtain religious
counsel or ministration, the admission of the letter into evidence was not error as being in viola-
tion of the religious privilege).
343. CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.6, 353 (1995).
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Information gained from a third party or easily accessible to a third
person is normally not privileged.3 44
The rationale for privileges has always been disputed. Most profes-
sional privileges have been justified by the need for clients, patients,
or others to communicate freely.345 Individuals must be able to pro-
vide information and discuss their emotions in this context. Disclo-
sure by the professional of private and even incriminating information
would deter this willingness to confide. Beyond this utilitarian balanc-
ing, other justifications for evidentiary privileges focus on values of
privacy and honor.346 Revealing confidences creates social embarass-
ment for the one confiding and a breach of trust for the discloser.
Ethical conflicts emerge for professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, or
clergy who are aware that in seeking information necessary for their
services, they may place clients at risk.
The clergy-penitent testimonial privilege has its roots in ancient
English common law, 34 7 and its antecedents may be found in Roman
Catholic doctrine that considered the Seal of Confession inviolate.348
The privilege was first recognized in the United States by a New York
court in 1813,349 which held that a Catholic priest could not be com-
pelled to reveal what he heard during confession. 350 The court found
344. See United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1980) (confession of a crime, made in
the presence of both a prison chaplain and a security officer, would not offer to the protections
of the privilege).
345. Dean Wigmore's influential treatise sets out a utilitarian balancing formula for the recog-
nition of a privilege.
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory main-
tenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tions must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.
See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (J. Mc-
Naughton ed., 1961).
346. See MCCORMICK, supra note 137, at 268. Professor McCormick's Evidence treatise lo-
cates the basis for privileges in the need for privacy. Compelled disclosure is considered wrong
because of the personal embarrassment created when secrets are revealed to third parties, and
the breach of the entrusted confidence. Id.
347. See generally Yellin, supra note 123, at 95 (reviewing clergy-communicant privilege
before the Reformation).
348. See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
349. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813). This case was not officially reported, but
an editor's report was abstracted in 1 W.L.J. 109 (1843) and is reprinted in Privileged Communi-
cations to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW 198 (1955).
350. See Phillips, 1 W.L.J. at 113.
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that forcing a priest to violate the secrecy of the confessional violated
the priest's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.351 As
early as 1875, in dictum, the Supreme Court stated: "On this princi-
ple, suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of
the confidence of the confessional .... "352 Today, all American
states353 and the federal courts354 recognize a clergy-penitent privi-
lege, although its scope varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many
clergy instinctively believe all information they receive is confidential,
and that a "privilege" immunizes them from revealing this informa-
tion or participating in any state mandated requirements such as the
duty to report elder abuse and neglect. This demonstrates considera-
ble confusion about the law and may subject clergy to a variety of
legal sanctions.355
351. Id.
352. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1975).
353. See ALA. R. EvID. 505; ALASKA R. EvID. 506; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (West
1994) (civil); id. § 13-4062(3) (West 1994) (criminal); ARK. R. EvID. 505; CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 917, 1030-1034 (Deering 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987 & Supp. 1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 1991); DEL. R. EvID. 505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West
1979 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-419.1 (Harrison 1981 & Supp. 1989); HAW. R. EVID.
506; IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (1990 & Supp. 1997); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (West 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950
& Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1965); Ky. R. EvID. 505; LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art.
511 (West 1995); ME. R. EVID. 505; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (1989); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (1997);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(4) (West 1996); MONT. CODE AN. § 26-1-804 (1997); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-506 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 330-A:16-c, 516.35 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1994); N.M. R. EVID. 11-506;
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); N.D. R. EVID. 505; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West 1993); OR.
REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
17-23 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 19-13-16 to -18 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980 & Supp. 1997); TEX. R.
EVID. 505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); VA.
CODE. ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3)
(West 1995 & Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie 1997).
354. See, e.g., Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The evidentiary
[priest-penitent] privilege as it has existed in the United States has been broadly recognized and
affirmed in dicta by the Supreme Court."); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3rd
Cir. 1990) (privilege applies "to protect communications made (1) to a clergyperson (2) in his or
her spiritual and professional capacity (3) with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality").
355. See Part IV.A.
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B. Relationship of Privilege to Reporting Requirements
Privileges generally apply only to questions posed in a court 356 and
do not literally relate to the obligation to report information to APS.
The evidentiary privilege is thus not necessarily applicable in the most
common situation: when a minister has reasonable belief that mis-
treatment of an elder has occurred and must decide how to respond.
Most often, neither the reporting statutes357 nor the privilege rules
and statutes explicitly answer this fundamental question about how
evidentiary rules apply. A limited number of administrative and judi-
cial opinions indicate that the clergy privilege is confined to the court-
room. 358 This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that most clergy-
communicant privileges are placed in the state's statutes or rules of
evidence 359 and use terms like "witness," 360 "testimony,"'361 or "litiga-
tion. ' 362 Some statutes provide that required reports do not have to
be disclosed by the mandatory reporter and cannot be revealed by the
public agency.363 Where a state wishes to apply evidentiary privileges
356. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 343, at 335.
357. See supra Part III.C.
358. Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 956 n.5 (Utah 1994) (noting that the clergy privilege is a
rule of evidence that prohibits certain communications from public disclosure in litigation); Wal-
stad v. State, 818 P.2d 695, 697 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (noting that psychotherapist-patient
and clergyman-penitent privileges were promulgated by state supreme court pursuant to its au-
thority to make rules governing procedure in civil and criminal cases and do not rest on any
independent basis, in contrast to the attorney-client privilege which is "inextricably tied to the
constitutional right to counsel").
359. See supra notes 339-50 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998) ("A person shall
not be examined as a witness in the following cases: .. .(3) A clergyman or priest, without
consent of the person making the confession .... ).
361. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN., § 34-46-3-1 (West 1998)
[T]he following persons shall not be required to testify regarding the following
communications:
(3) Clergymen, as to the following confessions, admissions, or confidential
communications:
(A) Confessions or admissions made to a clergyman in the course of discipline
enjoined by the clergyman's church.
(B) A confidential communication made to a clergyman in the clergyman's profes-
sional character as a spiritual adviser or counselor.
Id.
362. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., § 46-453(B) (West 1989) ("In any civil or criminal liti-
gation in which incapacitation, abuse, exploitation or neglect of an incapacitated or vulnerable
adult is an issue, a clergyman or priest shall not, without his consent, be examined as a witness
concerning any confession made to him in his role as a clergyman... ").
363. See, e.g., HAw. R. EVID. 502 (1998) ("A person ... either public or private, making a...
report required by law to be made has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing the.., report, if the law requiring it to be made so provides. A public
officer or agency to whom a ... report is required by law to be made has a privilege to refuse to
disclose the ... report if the law requiring it to be made so provides").
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to non-court situations, it may express that. New Jersey, for example,
provides a broad and explicit exemption to any reporting require-
ment.364 Moreover, even if applicable beyond the courtroom, the gen-
eral clergy privilege may be superseded by a subsequently enacted
and specific statutory obligation to report. This may be the case in
states where clergy are specifically mandated to report, 365 or a duty is
imposed on "every person. '366
Several state statutes are explicit. Two set out a clergy privilege not
to report elder abuse.367 A few grant a privilege not to testify in elder
abuse cases.368 Louisiana provides a clergy privilege not to testify in
"any proceeding" involving elder abuse-arguably a broader stan-
dard-but makes no explicit mention of the reporting situation.369
Texas, on the other hand, abrogates all privileges, including clergy,
364. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-16(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). The provision on the "Scope
of the Rules" states:
The provisions of article II, Privileges, shall apply in all cases and to all proceedings,
places and inquiries, whether formal, informal, public or private, as well as to all
branches of government and by whomsoever the same may be conducted, and none of
said provisions shall be subject to being relaxed.
Id. The priest-penitent privilege is contained within article II (codified at id. § 2A:84A-23 (West
1994 & Supp. 1998)).
365. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.010 (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-451(a)
(West Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 660.300(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT
ANN. § 200.5093(d) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1997) (§ d does provide an exemption for knowledge
acquired during a "confession"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5101.61 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998);
OR. REV. STAT. § 124.050(e) and § 124.060 (Supp. 1996).
366. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
367. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.109 (West 1999) ("The privileged quality of communication...
except... the privilege provided in s. 90.505... does not apply to any situation involving known
or suspected adult abuse, neglect, or exploitation and does not constitute a ground for failure to
report .... ") (emphasis added). Section 90.505(b) reads "A communication between a member
of the clergy and a person is "confidential" if made privately for the purpose of seeking spiritual
counsel and advice from the member of the clergy in the usual course of his or her practice or
discipline and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance
of the communication." Id. See also S.C. CODE. ANN. § 43-35-50 (Law. Co-op 1997) ("The
privileged quality of communication ... between a professional person and the person's patient
or client, except that between... priest and penitent, are abrogated and do not constitute grounds
for failing to report.., in any civil or criminal proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant
to this chapter.") (emphasis added).
368. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-453(B) (West 1999) ("In any civil or criminal litiga-
tion in which incapacitation, abuse, exploitation or neglect of an incapacitated or vulnerable
adult is an issue, a clergyman or priest shall not, without his consent, be examined as a witness
concerning any confession made to him in his role as a clergyman or a priest in the course of the
discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-35-50 (Law. Co-
op. 1997) ("The privileged quality of communication between ... a professional person and the
person's patient or client except that between priest and penitent, are abrogated and do not
constitute grounds for ... the exclusion of evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding resulting
from a report made pursuant to this chapter").
369. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2(M) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999) ("In any proceeding con-
cerning the abuse, neglect, or self-neglect of an adult, evidence may not be excluded on any
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with respect to its statutorily-mandated duty on "any person" to re-
port elder abuse.370 Four states generally abrogate privileges in their
elder abuse laws, but make an exception for clergy. 371 This fails to
define the scope of the privilege. Many states require "any person" to
report reasonably suspected elder abuse.372
Evidentiary privileges must be distinguished from the duty of confi-
dentiality imposed by professional codes or religious dictate.373 Many
professions have a code of ethics which enjoins confidentiality. 374
Whereas the law of privileges is determined by statute and court deci-
sion, ethical principles of confidentiality are constructed by private
groups,375 and the scope of such an ethical duty may differ from the
privilege accorded by state evidence law. The variables may include
what information is covered, who may waive confidentiality, and
which professional is recognized as having the duty to keep informa-
tion confidential.
Moreover, any privilege or privacy interest has limits, and this prin-
ciple applies clearly to information about elder abuse. The attorney-
ground of privilege, except in the case of communications between ...a priest, rabbi, duly
ordained minister, or Christian Science practitioner and his communicant.").
370. TEXAS HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.036 (1990 & Supp. 1999).
(a) ... a person having cause to believe that an elderly or disabled person is in the
state of abuse, exploitation or neglect shall report ....
(c) The duty imposed by subsection (a) applies without exception to a person whose
professonal communications are generally confidential including ... clergy members
Id.
371. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.109, 90.505 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-10-3-11(b), 34-46-
3-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (testimonial privilege retained); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403.2(M) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999) (testimonial privilege retained); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-
35-50 (Law. Co-op. 1997) (priest-penitent privilege retained).
372. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-7 (1993) ("[Alny person having reasonable cause to
believe that a vulnerable adult has been or is being abused, neglected or exploited shall report
such information ...."); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-3-302(1) (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-66-8
(1998).
373. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 345, § 2286 at 528-37 (discussing that communications made
in confidence do not necessarily create a legally recognized privilege).
374. See, e.g., ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 4-101(B)(a); ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(a); ANA, Code for Nurses 2 ("the nurse safeguards the
client's right to privacy by judiciously protecting information of a confidential nature"); APA,
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 5 ("Psychologists have a primary obligation to respect
the confidentiality of information obtained from persons in the course of their work as
psychologists").
375. See Part II.A. for discussion of religious duties of confidentiality. In the attorney-client
context, commentators agree that ethics committees tend to accord the rules of confidentiality a
broad reading while courts lean toward much narrower construction of similar principles under
the attorney-client privilege. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 24 FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5472, 90 (1986).
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client privilege, the oldest and best defined privilege, 376 may serve as
an illustrative example. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct es-
tablish that an attorney may not disclose a client's "confidential infor-
mation" except in limited circumstances, and that a lawyer violating
that prohibition is subject to discipline. 377 "Confidential information"
is broadly defined to include "other information gained in the profes-
sional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or
the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to
be detrimental to the client, '378 and information gained from others
beside the client.379 This ethical duty of confidentiality even applies
outside formal judicial proceedings. 380
The privilege is limited, however, when a client may commit a fu-
ture crime or fraud. 381 The ethical confidentiality principle permits, or
even requires, attorney disclosure of "the intention of [the attorney's]
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
it.' '382 Absent statutory exception, a lawyer would thus be obliged to
376. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084 (1998) (noting "the attorney-
client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communication").
377. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 4-101(B)(1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE] ("Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C) (a lawyer shall not knowingly...
[rieveal a confidence or secret of his client.); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule
1.6(a) (1998 ed.) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in para-
graph (b).").
378. MODEL CODE, supra note 377, at DR 4-101(A). The Model Rules provide a similar but
somewhat expanded definition of protected information, covering all information "relating to
the representation" of the client whether acquired by the attorney before or after the relation-
ship began and providing protection without regard to whether the client indicated the informa-
tion was to be confidential. Id.
379. Id. ("The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where
evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law .... A lawyer may not disclose
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law.").
380. 1 GEOFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HAND-
BOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.6:108, 142.2 (2d ed. Supp. 1998).
381. MCCORMICK, supra note 137, § 95 at 350.
382. See, e.g., Florida requires disclosure of information believed necessary to prevent a client
from committing any crime. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6(b)(1) (1998) ("A lawyer shall
reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes necessary: ... [t]o prevent a client from
committing a crime .... ) (emphasis added). Nevada, New Jersey, and Wisconsin also require
disclosure of confidential information limited to more serious crimes making disclosure
mandatory when the lawyer "reasonably believes" disclosure is necessary to prevent the client
from committing a crime involving death or serious bodily injury. NEV. Sup. CT. R. 156(2)
(1997); N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 1.6(b)(1) (1998); Wis. Sup. CT. R. 20:1.6(b)
(1998); Canon 37 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics provided that the announced inten-
tion of a client to commit a crime is not included in the confidences that the lawyer must respect.
ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr 69 (1984). Currently, the Model
Rules allow a lawyer to disclose information communicated by the client to the extent the lawyer
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report future elder mistreatment, because such behavior is typically
cyclical 383 and past behavior should ordinarily predict future abuse.384
Religious confidentiality strictures sometimes include a similar duty
to report situations involving mistreatment of the aged. 385 Repeated
abuse can lead to serious harm or even death to the elderly victim. It
may also produce other physical, psychological and economic conse-
quences. Many injuries from which a younger victim recovers quickly
may have long-term disabling effects on an elderly victim. 386 The con-
sequences of psychological or emotional abuse have been shown to be
more severe for older people than for younger people,387 causing de-
moralization and depression. 388 Many elderly persons depend on
fixed public or private pensions or benefits, so financial exploitation,
even in small amounts, may prevent them from obtaining needed
food, medicine, or utility services. 389 Economic losses are difficult for
the elderly to recoup and can reduce even financially comfortable eld-
erly people to a state of dire need.
Even where the clergy-penitent privilege is applicable to protect
against testimony in court, it is considerably more limited than is com-
monly realized by clergy. The statutes restrict its scope, limiting its
application to certain circumstances in which the privileged informa-
tion was transmitted and designating the type of clergy covered.
Eleven states restrict the privilege to statements made to clergy under
the "sanctity of a religious confessional" or "within the course of disci-
reasonably believes disclosure is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. MODEL RULES, supra note
377, at Rule 1.6(b).
383. See Part III.A.
384. See, e.g., Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-60 (Apr. 28, 1983) (authorizing
lawyer to reveal information regarding client who was abusing child and whom lawyer believed
would continue to do so in the future); see also Nancy Stuart, Note, Child Abuse Reporting: A
Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETICS 253, 258 (1987) (arguing
for an interpretation of ethics rules that permits reporting the continuing and future crime of
child abuse).
385. See, e.g., DoFF, supra note 127, at 40.
386. M. Bard & D. Sangrey, Old Bones Break So Easily and Mend So Slowly, in THE CRIME
VICTIM'S BOOK 24 (2d ed. 1986).
387. JORDAN I. KOSBERG & DAPHNE NAHMIASH, CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIMS AND PERPE-
TRATORS AND MILIEUS OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT, in Baumhover & Beall, supra note 293, at 33.
388. Mary C. Sengstock & Sally C. Steiner, Assessing Non-Physical Abuse, in ABUSE, NE-
GLECT, AND EXPLOITATION OF OLDER PERSONS 107-08 (Lorin A. Baumhover & S. Colleen Be-
all eds., 1996).
389. Lois Haight Herrington, Crime Has a Devastating, Tragic Impact on the Nation's Elderly,
JUST. ASSISTANCE NEWS, Aug. 1983, at 2 (excerpted testimony before Senate Subcommittee on
Aging).
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pline enjoined by [his] church. '390 Another nine states allow a testi-
monial privilege only to "confidential communications ... necessary
and proper to enable [the cleric] to discharge the functions of his of-
fice according to the usual practice or discipline of his church. ' '391
Often, courts will consider conversations to be within the statutory
privilege only if made for the purpose of seeking spiritual or religious
comfort.392 In the remaining states, the privilege protects "any confi-
dential communication made to clergy in his professional capacity, '393
a broader standard.
390. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233 (West 1994); See also IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (1990 &
Supp. 1997); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (b) (1965); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156
(West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (3) (West
1995 & Supp. 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (a)(ii) (Michie 1997). See also Commonwealth
v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 288, 690 A.2d 195, 200 (1997) (holding that because application of the
clergy-communicant privilege requires a finding of whether the communicant disclosed informa-
tion in confidence to a member of the clergy in his or her capacity as confessor or spiritual
advisor, "confidential communications to a member of the clergy, even for counseling or solace,
do not fall within the protections of the privilege unless motivated by spiritual or penitential
considerations.").
391. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-107 (1) (c) (1987 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.505 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1997); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-400 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1997).
392. See, e.g., State v. Van Welch, 448 So. 2d 705, 712 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding "priest-
penitent" privilege inapplicable because defendant did not approach witness, a "self-ordained"
minister, for spiritual counseling); State v. Andrews, 507 S.E.2d 305, 308 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(noting that under the ruling of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, when a minister is a
friend of the defendant and initiates contact, the clergy-penitent privilege does not apply); Peo-
ple v. McNeal, 677 N.E.2d 841, 852-53 (I11. 1997) (holding that the murder defendant's state-
ments were given to his brother outside of his brother's professional character as a spiritual
advisor, and therefore these statements were admissable); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La.
1975) (holding that when a communication was not made within the requisite nature of a confi-
dential disclosure for religious purposes of a penitent or a clergyman seeking religious consolida-
tion, the clergy-pentitent privilege does not apply); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Minn.
1980) (noting that aid requested of the chaplain must be religious to be privileged).
393. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 1991); see also ALA. R. EVID. 505; DEL. R.
EVID. 505 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995); HAW. R. EviD. 506; LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. art. 511 (West 1995); ME. R. EVID. 505; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111
(1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(c)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(4)
(West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (1996); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 330-A:16-c, 516.35 (1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.D. R.
EvID. 505; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505
(West 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-
op. 1985 & Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-16 to -18 (Michie 1995); TEX. R. EVID.
505, W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1993).
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Where clergy gain information while in a role other than that of
religious advisor, it is usually not privileged, even as to testimony in
court.394 Clearly, for instance, informal conversations with a minister,
relating to a host of topics, would not be protected. Communications
made to a minister as a friend are not privileged, 395 nor are fortui-
tously overheard conversations. 396 Actions, as opposed to communi-
cations, are generally deemed not privileged. 397
Courts have also restricted the clergy privilege to its specific ele-
ments. If information is supplied to religious personnel not named in
the statute, often no protection is afforded.398 If information about
394. See, e.g., Burger v. State, 231 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Ga. 1977) (holding that statements made to
a minister as a friend rather than as a clergyman were not privileged); Commonwealth v. Stew-
art, 690 A.2d 195, 199 (Pa. 1997) (stating that the clergy-penitent privilege only extends to confi-
dential communications to a "member of the clergy acting in a spiritual capacity"); In re
Koellen's Estate, 176 P.2d 544, 550-51 (Kan. 1947) (holding that statement made to a priest
about the location of a formerly executed will was not privileged); Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d
947, 956 (Utah 1994) (holding that the statutory clergy-penitent privilege will only apply if a
communication is made to a cleric acting in his or her religious role); Simrin v. Simrin, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 378-79 (1965) (holding that communications with rabbi during marital counseling
were not privileged under statute, but enforcing the parties' agreement to exclude such commu-
nications from evidence in light of public policy favoring reconciliation of spouses); State v.
Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Minn. 1980) (holding that the defendant's request that a prison
chaplain telephone friends outside prison was not privileged because aid requested was not reli-
gious); Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628, 632-33 (Ky. 1978) (where defendant spoke
to clergyman as "friend rather than as a minister," no privilege was recognized).
395. See, e.g., Burger v. State, 231 S.E.2d 769, 771 (Ga. 1977) (holding no privileged communi-
cation to cleric, who was also frequent companion, of intent to kill wife and her lover); Wainscott
v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1978) (communication to cleric as a friend, and not
acting in professional capacity, was not privileged); State v. Barber, 346 S.E.2d 441, 445 (N.C.
1986) (holding that statement made by defendant was not privileged because it was not en-
trusted to a member of the clergy in his professional capacity, but as a friend); Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 199-200 (Pa. 1997) (holding that communications are privileged when
made to a member of the clergy in the context of a penitential or spiritual matter).
396. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822, 828-29 (La. 1975) (privilege did not apply to
minister who heard communication because defendant did not come for spiritual direction);
State v. Martin, 959 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the clergy-penitent
privilege only applied to communications meant to be secret and remanding to determine if the
presence of the communicant's mother rendered the communication unconfidential).
397. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, State v. Kurtz, 564 S.w.2d 856, 861 (Mo. 1978) (testimony of priest
is admissible "when based on personal observations as distinguished from communications");
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES COURTS § 506.04[1][a], 506-8 (1999).
398. See, e.g., State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 1990) (religious "counselors"
who were not ordained or licensed ministers could be prosecuted for not reporting suspected
child abuse); People v. Thompson, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1982) (privilege was not applicable to
conversation of defendant with man who had been trained as an "ethics officer" in the "Church
of Scientology" but was not "ordained as an 'auditor' or minister at Church"); In re Cueto, 554
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a lay minister could not claim the privilege); In re Murtha,
279 A.2d 889, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (holding that a Catholic nun may not claim
the privilege).
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suspected elder mistreatment is received, even in "confidence," from
someone other than the penitent, for instance, a parish nurse who vis-
its older church members in their homes, or parishioners or neighbors,
it must be reported even if it was received in the course of the clergy
performing pastoral functions.
Persons or institutions entitled to assert the privilege are also de-
fined in varying ways by different states. Fourteen states restrict the
privilege to a "bona fide established church or religious organiza-
tion. ' '399 Others broaden this definition, according a privilege to any
"clergyman or priest,"4°° but still leave definitional ambiguities for po-
tential dispute. 401
C. Affirmative Defense
1. Common Law Protection Afforded Clergy-Penitent
Communications
Although an injured aged person may establish liability for the
clergyperson, an affirmative defense based on a limited clergy-peni-
tent privilege should be recognized in defined circumstances. The
burden of establishing such a defense should be placed upon the de-
fendant-minister. Evidentiary and pleading burdens are typically allo-
cated between the parties in accordance with public policy
399. See ALA. R. EvID. 505 ("a clergyman is any duly ordained ... practitioner of any bona
fide established church or religious organization"); see also FLA. STAT ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979
& Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1965); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111
(Michie 1989); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(4)
(West 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 330-A:16-c, 516.35 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2
(1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (C) (West 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943
(West 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997); S.C. CODE § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie
1992 & Supp. 1997).
400. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12-2233 (West 1994) ("any clergyman or priest"); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (1990 & Supp.
1997); IND. CODE § 34-1-14-5 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(c)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998); MONTr. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.255 (Michie 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5.60.060(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); WVo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie 1997).
401. It is quite uncertain, for example, whether all Jehovah's Witnesses are ministers, although
the denomination claims this to be true. Reese, supra note 135, at 55, 66. See Cimijotti v. Paul-
sen, 219 F. Supp. 621, 624 (N.D. Iowa 1963) (construing the Iowa clergy-penitent privilege to
extend to the disclosure of confidential communications by a member of the clergy for the pur-
pose of seeking advice); Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 292 (Iowa 1917) (elders of the
Presbyterian Church included in statute granting privilege to "minister of the gospel"). But see,
Rutledge v. State, 525 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind. 1988) (holding that a member of Gideons Interna-
tional, a group of businessmen who also pass out the word of God, was not a clergyman within
the meaning of Indiana's clergy-pentitent privilege); Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201, 204 (1881) (hold-
ing elder and deacon not covered by minister's privilege).
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considerations.40 2 Thus, the clergyperson should have to justify
nonreporting when credible evidence of mistreatment is present. As
the Supreme Court has noted in another context: "[p]resumptions
shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial evalu-
ations of probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to
the proof. '40 3 The defendant clergyperson is best positioned to show
why a report was not made, the factors that were taken into account,
and the extent to which they influenced his decision-making process.
The court must then evaluate the clergyperson's asserted reason for
his action/inaction, and balance it against the harm which could be
suffered by the elderly citizen under the particular facts. Moreover,
such a defense should be a reluctantly granted exception to the strong
public policy established by the statutory duty to report.40 4 These laws
demonstrate that state legislatures clearly appreciated that mistreat-
ment is often clandestine and occurs in isolated, hard to penetrate ve-
nues.40 5 Allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendent accords
with that recognition.
Society's interest in fostering communications between clergy and
others as well as cleric's religious rights should outweigh the apparent
efficacy of compelled disclosure of elder mistreatment when four tests
are met. First, the information must have been obtained under cir-
cumstances where a reasonable expectation of privacy existed for both
clergy and communicant, and thus the communication was not in-
tended for further disclosure. 40 6 Information received from public
402. See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 120 (1996); David S. Cohen, The Evidentiary Predicate for
Affirmative Action After Croson: A Proposal for Shifting the Burdens of Proof 7 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 489 (1989); Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justices, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981); Charles V. Laughlin, The
Location of the Burden of Persuasion, 18 U. Prrr. L. REV. 3 (1956).
403. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
404. See Part III.C.
405. Molly Dickinson Velick, Mandatory Reporting Statutes: A Necessary Yet Underutilized
Response to Elder Abuse, 3 ELDER L.J. 165, 174 (1995).
406. See, e.g., State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162, 1170 (Me. 1994) (holding that it is unreasonable
to believe that a person who simply performs AA duties at a jail functions as a member of the
clergy who is bound to the clergy-pentitent privilege); State v. List, 636 A.2d 1054, 1057 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1993) (letter written to pastor but left in plain view in defendant's home after
murders had no expectation of privacy); Lucy v. State, 443 So. 2d 1335, 1340-41 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983) (holding that communications were not confidential because defendant, after stabbing girl-
friend and going to a minister's home, did not ask the minister to keep his whereabouts secret
and watched the minister call the police); Santmier v. Santmier, 494 So. 2d 95, 97 (Ala. Civ. App.
1986) (the privilege "does not include all communications with one's clergyman" where woman
did not approach clergyman to make a confession or to seek "his counsel, comfort, or advice. . ."
but clergyman initiated conversation with her "to express to her his concern about the effect her
affair was having upon the church family and her husband's work for the church," clergyman's
testimony about what she said to him was not covered by the privilege); Tankersley v. State, 724
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sources, or in a public context, would not qualify. Second, the clergy
must also have been obliged by religious tenet to maintain the secrecy
of such communication. 407 Third, the clergyperson must have acted in
a reasonable manner. Although no report was made to public author-
ities, affirmative steps were taken to ascertain whether the informa-
tion was accurate, and if so, actions were initiated to confront both
abuser's and victim's problems. Fourth, in the particular factual situa-
tion, the balance between privacy interests and society's need for in-
formation must clearly weigh on the confidentiality side. 40 8
So. 2d 557, 562 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that no reasonable expectation of confidentiality
attaches to statements made to member of the clergy concerning a threat of violence to a third
party).
407. See Part II.A. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 388 n.21 (3d Cir.
1990) (noting that "ascertain[ing] the types of communications that the denomination deems
spiritual and confidential is both a necessary and a constitutionally inoffensive threshold step in
determining whether a privilege interdenominational in nature applies in light of the facts and
circumstances of a particular case."); People v. Diercks, 411 N.E.2d 97 (I11. App. Ct. 1980) (privi-
lege not applicable where there was no showing "that the disclosure of [defendant's] confession
by [clergyman] would be enjoined by the ... Baptist Church"; People v. Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr.
53, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (trial court did not err in finding that the communication "was not a
penitential communication within legal contemplation" and was therefore not subject to the
privilege).
408. The Supreme Court performed this type of balancing between individuals' privacy inter-
ests and society's need for information explicitly in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 458 (1977), and implicitly in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600-03 (1977). See Gary R.
Clouse, Comment, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information, 77 Nw. U.L. REV.
536, 558 (1982). In Nixon, the court conceded that Nixon's privacy interests were threatened by
the requirement that his presidential materials be screened by government archivists, Nixon, 433
U.S. at 457-58, 465, but stated that "any intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in
subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's administration to archival screening." Id. at
458. In Whalen, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring physi-
cians to report to the state health department information about any patient to whom they pre-
scribed narcotic drugs. The Court held that although the statute constituted a threat to the
legitimate privacy interest of a patient, the threat was not "sufficiently grievous.., to establish a
constitutional violation," Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600. The Court noted the state's interest in con-
trolling the distribution of narcotic substances, see id. at 598, and the stringent safeguards against
public disclosure beyond the health department. See id. at 593-95, 601.
Lower federal courts have also balanced the privacy interests of individuals against state inter-
ests. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-80 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that employees' medical records fell within a zone of privacy entitled to constitutional
protection, but that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health was entitled to
access to the information because of the public interest in safe working conditions and because
adequate provisions were made to prevent further dissemination); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d
1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that although a Florida statute requiring elected oficials to
make financial disclosures threatened the privacy interests of the oficials, that interest was out-
weighed by the public interest in discouraging official corruption and in strengthening public
confidence in state government); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 618-19 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (balancing the state's interest in discovery against a patient's right to maintain private
medical records); Conant v. McCaffrey, 1998 WL 164946, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal.) (holding that the
government's interest in enforcing prohibitions on the illegal use of marijuana outweighed the
individual's limited privacy interest in medical records that had been redacted to hide the indi-
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Recognition of a clergyperson's affirmative defense in appropriate
instances promotes public policy. As the Supreme Court noted in
Trammell v. United States,40 9 "the [clergy-penitent] privilege recog-
nizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and
absolute confidence, what are believed to be the flawed acts or
thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in re-
turn. ' 410  Possible criminal prosecution, potential civil liability, and
state-sponsored protective services are not the only, or even the most
effective, protections against elder mistreatment. In fact, considerable
evidence suggests that this elaborate legal edifice has not succeeded in
stemming, or even reducing, elder abuse.411 Private intervention and
the tangible and intangible support of religious organizations may pro-
duce better results than those available through the secular state.412
An abuser may confess and seek spiritual guidance or material sup-
port from the pastor and religious community. The "confession" can
be the catalyst for new behavior. In fact, repentance and accountabil-
ity for the evil in which the penitant participated may ameliorate or
end past wrongs. The religious concept of repentance is rooted in the
Greek word metanoia which means "to turn around. ' 413 True repen-
tance does not deal with feeling, but with action-changing one's be-
havior, reversing direction.414 Holding abusers accountable within the
context of their faith experience can also be instrumental in changing
vidual's name); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 904 F. Supp. 1038, 1050 (D. N.D. 1995) (weighing the
state's interest in protecting residential privacy against an individual's First Amendment rights).
State courts have occasionally accorded greater protection to the right of informational privacy
than have federal courts, but their decisions have been based on both state and federal constitu-
tions. See, e.g., Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n., 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1977); Jones v.
Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 156-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
409. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
410. Id. at 51.
411. 1981 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8. Ten years later, a follow-up congres-
sional report, "Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and Inaction," determined the situation had
worsened; elder maltreatment was increasing and 5% of the elderly, or more than 1.5 million
elderly persons, were estimated abused yearly. 1990 ELDER ABUSE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8
(estimating more than 1.5 million persons may be victims of such abuse each year, and the
number is rising). Ninety percent of states reported to the Committee that the incidence of elder
mistreatment was increasing. Id. at XIV. In 1998 the California legislature made the following
specific findings with regard to the prevalence of elder abuse in the nation's largest state: "Cali-
fornia's mandatory reporting laws, first enacted in 1982, have brought the tragedy of elder and
dependent adult abuse to public attention. Annually, 225,000 incidents of adult abuse occur in
California-an increase of over 1000 percent over the number of incidents in 1986-87." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.07 (West Supp. 1999).
412. Churches maintain a vast array of social welfare institutions, which can and do provide
financial aid, volunteers, and social services to members and their families. Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673-74 (1970).
413. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1119 (1982).
414. One ecclesiastical authority has described repentence in a related context as follows:
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the community's perception that domination, mistreatment, and vio-
lence are socially and religiously acceptable. 415
The clergyperson's affirmative defense rests on a qualified privilege
not to disclose. Privileges, including the clergy-penitent privilege, are
based on (1) "the imperative need for confidence and trust" between
the communicants; 416 and (2) the promotion of "public ends. '417 Con-
gregants will not confide their behavior and feelings to clergy when
damaging information must necessarily be transmitted to APS for civil
or possible criminal proceedings. 418 Acceptance of the principle that
clergy need not disclose suspected elder abuse to public authorities in
some instances also fosters public ends. Religious congregations are
one of the only social institutions that regularly see entire families.
But clergy must be trained 419 and motivated to use this opportunity to
apply the theological insights of both Jewish and Christian tradi-
tions420 that condemn elder mistreatment.
[T]he abuser takes the steps necessary for justice-making to make amends for the
abuse, including restitution [which may include: providing for the victim's needs or pay-
ing for therapy], acknowledgment [of the harm done], etc.; the abuser identifies beliefs
and attitudes that lie behind his/her abusive behavior, and rejects those beliefs and
attitudes; the abuser becomes aware of the needs that lie behind his/her abusive behav-
ior, and finds ethical ways of meeting those needs; the abuser identifies the conditions
that allowed the abuse to happen, and changes those conditions to prevent further
abuse.
CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CLERGY MISCONDUCT: SEX-
UAL ABUSE IN THE MINISTERIAL RELATIONSHIP 66 (1992).
415. Marie M. Fortune, Ministry in Response to Violence in the Family: Pastoral and Prophetic,
in VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY: A WORKSHOP CURRICULUM FOR CLERGY AND OTHER HELPERS
201 (1991).
416. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at
51 (1980)).
417. Id. at 11 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
418. In the child abuse context, commentators have argued that competing interests should be
reconciled by permitting disclosures to be used only for the purpose of protecting the child. See,
e.g., Nancy E. Stuart, Note, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidential-
ity, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 243, 258 (1987) (arguing that courts should impose mandatory duty
on attorneys to report but limit reporting to civil authorities only). For the most part, these
recommendations have not been followed. See, e.g., People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725, 729 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1991) (finding purpose of reporting statutes not merely to remove victim from harm but
also to aid in prosecution of perpetrator) (citing People v. Battaglia, 203 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984)).
419. See Alberta D. Wood & Maureen C. McHugh, Women Battering: The Response of the
Clergy, 42 PASTORAL PSYCHOL. 192 (1994) (stating that members of the clergy wanted to help in
domestic violence situations but were hampered by their lack of counseling training, and by their
limited knowledge of treatment programs, legal options, and programs for abusers).
420. See, e.g., Isaiah 1:16-17, 61:1-3; Amos, 8:4-10 (expressing a deep concern for the weak,
disadvantaged, defenseless, and elderly); Leviticus 19:32 (requiring a respect for the elderly bor-
dering on reverence); Exodus 20:12 (commanding a person to honor parents). See, e.g., I
Timothy 5:3-16 (placing older people and widows at the status of role models to younger mem-
bers of the community); Matthew 22:33-40 (containing Jesus' basic command of love for others,
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In the legal context, Jeremy Bentham, generally an opponent of
privileges, notes "[r]epentance and consequent abstinence from fur-
ther misdeeds of the like nature-repentance, followed even by satis-
faction in some shape or other, satisfaction more or less adequate for
the past: such are other well-known consequences of [clergy-penitent
communication]. "421
In the first judicial recognition of the clergy privilege, a New York
court declared:
[W]hen a man under the agonies of an afflicted conscience and the
disquietudes of a perturbed mind, applies to a minister of the Al-
mighty, lays bare his bosom filled with guilt, and opens his heart
black with crime, and solicits from him advice and consolation, in
this hour of penitence and remorse, and when this confession and
disclosure may be followed by the most salutary effects upon the
religious principles and future conduct of the penitent, and may
open to him prospects which may bless the remnant of his life, with
the soul's calm sunshine and the heart-felt joy, without interfering
with the interests of society, surely the establishment of a rule
throwing all these pleasure prospects into shade, and prostrating the
relation between the penitent and the comforter, between the vo-
tary and the minister of religion, must be pronounced a heresy in
our legal code.422
Although the status of communications and confession to clergy
varies among different religious denominations,42 3 the effectiveness of
the clergy-parishioner relationship is compromised by an absolute dis-
closure requirement. Trust is essential to open communications. If all
the information clergy learned had to be disclosed, they might be reti-
cent to elicit information, inhibiting the flow of communication. 424
Moreover, mandatory disclosure might well undermine the basis of
the testimonial exemption because clergy-penitent communication is
privileged only if intended to be confidential. 42 5 A reporting statute
could imply that confidentiality is not intended.
which includes the elderly); Acts 6:1; I Timothy 5:4, 8, 16; James 1:27 (in which clear illustrations
appear as to the respect and care Christians are supposed to offer the elderly, especially widows
and family members).
421. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, 588-91 (1827), reprinted in 8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 345, § 2396 at 877.
422. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813) (quoted in Privileged Communications, supra note
349, at 204).
423. See supra Part II.A.
424. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27-28 (1975)
(describing the criminal defense attorney's trilemma). See Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:
An Empirical Study, 70 MICH L. REV. 229, 275 Table X (1971) (finding that 17.7% of reporters
thought that a privilege would ease inhibitions induced by subpoena threats).
425. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 137, § 91 at 333 ("It is of the essence of the privilege
that it is limited to those communications which the client either expressly made confidential or
1999]
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A privacy rationale justifying the recognition of a clergy privilege
provides a different and independent basis for exemption from
mandatory reporting requirements. 426 The common law has long rec-
ognized an individual's interest in the nondisclosure of embarassing or
private facts.427 Moreover, the federal Constitution and most state
constitutions have been interpreted to provide a legally protected in-
terest in the privacy of confidential communications, at least against
governmental intrusion. The Fourth Amendment, which protects an
individual's right of privacy against "unreasonable" search and
seizure, 428 has been interpreted to bar unauthorized government
eavesdropping or recording. 42 9 "What an individual seeks to preserve
as private may be constitutionally protected. ' 430 The test is whether a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" exists.431 The Supreme Court has
also recognized that an individual's interest in privacy includes an in-
terest in controlling the dissemination of private information about
himself.432 This interest may include the minister's nondisclosure of
particular facts.
Other recognized constitutional interests are likewise implicated by
a uniform rule that that clergy must report information about sus-
pected or known elder mistreatment, no matter how obtained, to pub-
which he could reasonably assume under the circumstances would be understood by the attorney
as so intended.").
426. See Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, in
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1481-83 (1985).
427. Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 338-39 (Wash. 1998) (noting that a tort action for
invasion of privacy exists in Washington); Rothstein v. Montefiore Home, 689 N.E.2d 108, 110
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that because an action for the invasion of privacy compensates a
victim for mental suffering, shame, or humiliation, the victim, not the victim's estate, may assert
this cause of action); Childers v. A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282, 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (labeling an
invasion of privacy as an intentional tort); Winegar v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Iowa 1977)
(recognizing the common law tort for invasion of privacy as a valid cause of action in Iowa);
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the plaintiff had a
valid cause of action for invasion of privacy against the defendant). But see Richie v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a cause of action for the invasion of
privacy based solely on emotional harm is not recognized in Minnesota); Andrews v. Bruk, 610
N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (noting that no common law right to privacy exists in
New York).
428. U.S. CONs-r., amend. IV.
429. See, e.g., Hodari D. v. California, 499 U.S. 621, 632 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pay-
ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 592 n.33 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
430. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
431. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
39-40 (1988); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
432. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 762 (1989); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); Nixon v. Administration of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (arguing
privacy interests include control of information about ourselves).
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lic authorities. Observers have long recognized that religious, and
indeed other, organizations are meaningful protectors of individual
liberties against overbearing governmental authority and coercion.433
The unenumerated right to associate has a distinguished pedigree.434
Association in the religious context has additional attributes. As Jus-
tice Brennan has written, "for many individuals, religious activity de-
rives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious
community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of
shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation
of individuals. '435
2. Federal Constitutional and Statutory Protection Afforded Free
Exercise of Religion
a. First Amendment Issues
Clergy may argue that even if no "privilege" exists, the First
Amendment provides an exemption for their nondisclosure of elder
abuse information to authorities because the reporting requirements
substantially burden or prohibit free exercise of religion. Throughout
our history, government actors have treated religious people vari-
ously, sometimes with favored status, sometimes with disfavored sta-
tus, and sometimes with indifference. 436 While these varying forms of
treatment by the government occurred, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the First Amendment to the Constitution437 to provide various
levels of protection to the free exercise of religion.438
433. "The principle of association" is "a principle in which political parties, professional as-
sociations, social clubs, families, labor unions, religious organizations, and other private collec-
tivities are thought entitled" "to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of their
competence an authority so effective as to justify labeling it ...sovereign." ALEXIS DE To-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 242 (2d ed. 1863) (quoted in LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-16, at 1297 (2d ed. 1988)).
434. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found. Inc., 119 S. Ct. 636, 654 (1999);
California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 211 (1993); Dawson v.
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 164 (1992); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). See
also Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2-
3 (1964).
435. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
436. See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1559 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
437. The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ..." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
438. For discussion of these levels of protection, see Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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(i) The Protection of Religious Freedom in Historical Perspective
The Bill of Rights initially did not apply to the states, governing
instead only the national government.439 In 1878, the Supreme Court,
in Reynolds v. United States,440 upheld federal legislation that imposed
criminal sanctions on Mormons for practicing plural marriage (polyg-
amy).441 The Court determined that Congress could prohibit any con-
duct regardless of the religious implications but it could not formally
prohibit any religious beliefs. 442 The Court, in Davis v. Beason 43 and
Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States,444 subsequently upheld other laws that, through penal-
ties, burdened the practice of the Mormon religion. The Supreme
Court also upheld other burdens imposed by law on the free exercise
of religion.4 45
However, these cases represent a time in American history during
which religious minority groups were subject to considerable hostility
and mistreatment. They also demonstrate that a standard was needed
which would provide a greater measure of protection for the free ex-
ercise of religion under the First Amendment. A new era was sig-
naled in 1940 when the Supreme Court made the Free Exercise Clause
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.4 46
(ii) The "Strict Scrutiny" Standard under Sherbert
In a series of cases over two and a half decades, the Supreme Court
extended the highest level of protection afforded under the Constitu-
tion to the free exercise of religion.447 In 1963, the Court held, in
Sherbert v. Verner,448 that state unemployment benefits could not be
439. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-251 (1833).
440. 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878).
441. Id.
442. Id. at 164 ("Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.").
443. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
444. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
445. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922) (upholding compulsory vaccinations);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccinations).
446. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
447. In addition to the three case discussed in this section, see Frazee v. Dep't of Employment
Security, 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (holding that the denial of unemployment compensation to
worker who refused job because it would have required him to work on his sabbath violated the
Free Exercise Clause); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987)
(holding that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to claimant, who was dis-
charged for refusing to work on her sabbath, violated the Free Exercise Clause).
448. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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denied to a Seventh-Day Adventist employee because she refused to
work on Saturdays due to her religious beliefs.449 In a 1972 case, Wis-
consin v. Yoder,450 the Court held that Wisconsin could not require
members of the Amish Church to send their children to public schools
after the eighth grade.451 In the 1981 case, Thomas v. Review
Board,452 the Court held that Indiana violated the plaintiff's right to
free exercise when the review board denied him unemployment com-
pensation benefits after he had terminated his job because his reli-
gious beliefs forbade participation in the production of armaments.453
In each of these cases, the Court protected religious freedom by ap-
plying the strict scrutiny standard which requires that, before the gov-
ernment may place a substantial burden on the freedom, it must show
a compelling interest with narrowly tailored means to achieve that
end.454 This strict scrutiny standard was formally proclaimed between
1963 and 1990 but so often determined to be satisfied that it is debata-
ble whether it indeed controlled free exercise jurisprudence even dur-
ing this period.455
(iii) The "Lesser Scrutiny" Standard Under Smith
In 1990, the Supreme Court lowered the standard of scrutiny that it
would apply to government action in free exercise cases. In Employ-
ment Division v. Smith,456 the Court held that the government may
apply neutral, generally applicable laws that suppress religious prac-
tices.457 It also held that the state does not need to have any reason for
refusing exemptions for the free exercise of religion.458 Today, if
449. Id. at 409.
450. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
451. Id. at 236.
452. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
453. Id. at 720.
454. Id. at 719 (stating that "[n]either of the interests advanced [by the state] is sufficiently
compelling to justify the burden upon Thomas' religious liberty."); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (stat-
ing that for the state's requirement to be upheld "there... [must be] a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause."); Sher-
bert, 374 U.S. at 406 (stating that the Court would "consider whether some compelling state
interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substan-
tial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right").
455. Among the notable cases during this period which disallowed exemptions for religious
claims were: Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 712 (1986); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990);
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452-53 (1988); Tony and
Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
456. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
457. Id.
458. Id.
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"generally applicable, religion-neutral laws [e.g., the elder abuse dis-
closure obligation] ... have the effect of burdening a particular reli-
gious practice," the Court holds that the Free Exercise Clause does
not mandate an exemption for noncompliance. 459 "[T]he right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes
(or proscribes). ''460 The majority opinion in Smith did allow such ex-
emptions as a matter of legislative decision-making. 461 The Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment in Smith has remained
intact. 462
Members of Congress have attempted to "overrule" the Smith opin-
ion through proposed amendments to the Constitution463 and through
legislative enactment.464 These proposals seek to restore heightened
protection to free exercise. 465 However, any constitutional amend-
ment would take considerable time and would face the serious obsta-
cle posed by the ratification process.
(iv) Establishment Clause
Would a judicially-created defense for a clergyperson in a civil dam-
age action violate the federal constitution? The First Amendment was
intended to safeguard religious liberty.466 Professor McConnell has
discussed at length the framer's sensitivity to religious diversity in the
United States.467 Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, infra, would seem
to bar an affirmative defense exempting clergy from generally applica-
ble laws unless it were created by the legislature.468 Smith does, how-
ever, provide an argument for religiously based exemptions where a
Free Exercise right is implicated "in conjunction with other constitu-
459. Id. at 886 n.3.
460. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
461. Id. at 890 (interpreting the First Amendment to permit a legislature to create an exemp-
tion, but not requiring one).
462. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
463. See Robert P. George, Protecting Religious Liberty in the Next Millennium: Should We
Amend the Religion Clauses of the Constitution?, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 27 (1998).
464. See infra Part V.C.2.b.
465. See infra Part V.C.2.b.
466. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 564 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (religion clauses
represent "profound committment to religious liberty").
467. McConnell, supra note 436, at 1475-80.
468. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (interpreting Free Exercise Clause to
permit legislatively crafted exemptions to laws of general applicability).
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tional protections. '469 Although the Supreme Court has not revisited
this issue since Smith, a number of federal circuit courts have subse-
quently recognized the viability of exemptions based on Free Exercise
claims when they are linked to another constitutional right. 470
A clergyperson's interest in not reporting instances of elder abuse,
in the narrow factual circumstances outlined above, should qualify as
such a "hybrid claim." First, in order to meet Free Exercise jurispru-
dential tests, the claim must be religious in nature, 471 sincerely
made,472 and the burden on religious practice substantial-"directly
or indirectly mak[ing] the believer's religious duty more difficult or
more costly. '473 The burden placed on religious practice of clergy and
parishioner by the reporting requirement is demonstrable. Second, a
number of independent constitutional rights-privacy and associa-
tion-are implicated by government's blanket demand that a minister
report suspected elder mistreatment. 474 But would an exemption vio-
late the other prong of religious liberty-the ban on establishing
religion?
In other situations, the Supreme Court has indicated "ample room"
exists between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
for government action providing "benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without in-
469. Id. at 881 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) ("invalidating a
licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had dis-
cretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious")); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 117 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of
religious ideas); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944) (same). The rights of
parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), to direct the education
of their children has also been used in conjunction with a Free Exercise claim. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to
Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school). The majority
in Smith found only a Free Exercise claim present. Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 882.
470. See Thomas & Baker v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm., 165 F.3d 692, 704 n.7 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that a valid hybrid claim is composed of both a free exercise challenge and some
other constitutional claim); Equal Employment Opp. Comm'n v. The Catholic Univ. of America,
83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that free exercise claim exists when enforcement of
Title VII infringes on both the free exercise of religion and the right to be free from excessive
government entanglement with religion); see also American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v.
Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that a hybrid claim arises if a law
implicates another constitutional right in addition to the right to free exercise); Cornerstone
Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472-73 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that a free exercise
claim may be sustained, because the city's ordinance impinged upon both the right to free exer-
cise and the right to free speech).
471. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714-15 (1981).
472. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971).
473. TRIBE, supra note 433, at 1247; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990).
474. See supra notes 426-434 and accompanying text.
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terference. ' 475 "[W]e in no way suggest that all benefits conferred ex-
clusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on account of their
religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless
they are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. '476 The standard for
evaluating an Establishment Clause violation is still the three-prong
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.47 7 Government action violates the Estab-
lishment Clause only if (1) it does not have a "secular legislative pur-
pose;" (2) its "principal or primary effect" is to advance or inhibit
religion; or (3) it fosters an "excessive government entanglement"
with religion. 478 Similarly, under the "endorsement" test, an alterna-
tive to Lemon, courts look to "whether the challenged governmental
practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion. '479
Certainly, maintaining clergy-parishioner confidentiality in these lim-
ited circumstances does not risk "endorsing" religion or unnecessarily
"entangling" the government in religious affairs. An exemption for
clergy from the duty to report elder abuse, which has a disparate im-
pact on particular religious groups and individuals, confers no special
benefit. 480 Under Lemon, a "secular legislative purpose" 481 is present
in the protection of privacy and association in this intimate
relationship. 482
The existence of such an affirmative defense does not have the ef-
fect of advancing religion,483 the second prong of the Lemon test, for
it only promotes equal treatment of religion. 484 The information pro-
tected may have been derived from any communicant, and not even
one of the clergyperson's denomination; nor would it necessarily have
475. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
476. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989).
477. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
478. Id. at 612-13.
479. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
480. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704-06
(1994) (holding that "the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by allevi-
ating special burdens ... [but does not allow] an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of polit-
ical power to a religious group"); cf Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1282-1301 (1994) (proffering an "equal regard" approach to religious
exemptions).
481. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
482. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (noting that alleviating governmental interference with ability of
religious organizations to carry out their religious mission is a permissible legislative purpose).
483. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (1971).
484. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (noting than an accommodation
is constitutional if "designed to alleviate government intrusions that might significantly deter
adherents of a particular faith" from engaging in religious conduct pursuant to their faith).
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been obtained through religiously commanded confession or obser-
vance. The final Lemon criterion, forbidding excessive church-state
"entanglement," is not violated because courts routinely inquire into
the "sincerity" of religious belief in First Amendment contexts.485
b. Religious Freedom Protection Under Federal Statutory Law:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")
and Beyond
In response to the Smith decision, Congress enacted and President
Clinton signed into law the RFRA, 486 which reestablished the greatest
level of protection to religious exercise. The purposes of the statute
were to restore the compelling interest test as the standard that courts
are to apply in free exercise cases and to provide a claim or defense to
persons whose religious exercise was substantially burdened.487
The RFRA provided that a party will have a claim or defense under
the Act when the party shows that the government has "substantially
burdened" that party's free exercise rights.488 Thus, the RFRA pro-
hibits the government from placing a substantial burden on the free
exercise of religion except in the most narrow of instances.489 For the
government's burden on free exercise to be upheld by a court, the
government's action must undergo the strictest of scrutiny. First, the
government must demonstrate that the burden on religion furthers a
485. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 693 (1989) (noting that an otherwise
valid claim of religious benefit may be rejected if an individual's beliefs are not sincerely held).
486. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). In the Act itself, Congress stated that the state was enacted
to restore the compelling interest test that Employment Division v. Smith had eliminated. Id.
487. Id. The Act outlines the purposes as follows:
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substan-
tially burdened by government.
Id.
488. Id. (providing "a claim or defense to person whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government"). In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had noted that the state is not
"unduly to infringe the protected freedom [of the exercise of religion]." Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
489. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994) (stating that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section").
1999]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1
compelling governmental interest. 490 Second, the government must
show that the means employed were the least restrictive means avail-
able to further its compelling interest. 491
In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court invalidated
the RFRA as applied to the states.492 However, the RFRA is still
valid with regard to federal actors. Congress is presently considering
alternative legislation that would provide heightened protection to
religious liberty.493
3. State Constitutional and Statutory Protection Afforded Free
Exercise of Religion
State law may provide greater protections than are available under
the federal constitution or laws.494 State constitutions, as "docu-
ment[s] whose vitality and force are independent of [their] federal
counterpart, ' '495 are increasingly being interpreted by state courts to
provide significant protections to civil rights and liberties.496 Some
commentators have suggested that these constitutions provide some
of the surest bases for securing the blessing of religious liberty.497
State courts and legislatures have recently provided heightened levels
490. Id. at 1(b) (stating that "[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person ... is [inter alia] in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest").
491. Id. (stating that "[g]overnment may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person ... is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest").
492. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
493. For a thoughtful discussion of Congress' limited role in protecting religious liberty, see
Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Lim-
ited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633 (1998).
494. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); First Covenant
Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (stating "Washington,
like all the states, may provide greater protection for individual rights, based on its 'sovereign
right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred
by the Federal Constitution"') (quoting Washington v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (1986)).
495. See Mandel v. Hodges, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 257 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). See also Smith v.
Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 930 (Cal. 1996) (stating that "'[riespect for
our Constitution as 'a document of independent force' forbids use to abandon settled applica-
tions of its terms every time changes are announced in the interpretation of the federal char-
ter'") (quoting People v. Pettingill, 578 P.2d 108, 118 (Cal. 1978)).
496. See William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1997); Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Abney, The Double Security of
Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberty Under the Arizona Constitituion, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115
(1988); Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575
(1989).
497. See David E. McGraw, "Free Exercise" Under the State Constitution: Will the Exception
Become the Rule, 12 ToURo L. REV. 677 (1996); Stuart G. Parsell, Revitalization of the Free
1999] WHEN SILENCE RESOUNDS
of state protection for religious freedom.498 And now, in the wake of
the Smith and City of Boerne decisions, the guarantees afforded to the
free exercise of religion under state constitutions and statutes are be-
coming increasingly important to religious individuals.499
a. Heightened Protection for Religious Freedom
In some jurisdictions, state constitutions or statutory law affords the
free exercise of religion the highest level of protection, requiring any
state-imposed burden on religious freedom to undergo strict scrutiny
analysis. A number of state appellate courts have interpreted their
constitutions to require strict scrutiny analysis. 500 In some cases,
Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 756 (1993).
498. See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerg-
ing Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (1993); Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA:
Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235 (1998);
Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their
Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017 (1994).
499. See JENNIFER FRIESEN WITH HOWARD W. GILLINGHAM, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (1992); see also BARRY LYNN ET AL.,
THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 107 (2d ed. 1995).
500. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Wright v. Raines, 571 P.2d
26, 32 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that "[o]nly those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion"); Curtis
v. School Committe of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 587 (1995) (reaffirming its prior holding in
Attorney General v. Desilets & Another, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235-36 (1994), in which it endorsed
United States Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as it existed prior to the Smith
decision); Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573-
74 (1990) (applying the strict scrutiny standard and holding that the governmental restriction
unconstitutionally restrained the state constitutional freedom of religious worship and that the
government's interest in historic preservation was "not sufficiently compelling"); Hill-Murray
Fed'n of Teachers, St. Paul, Minn. v. Hill-Murray High School, Maplewood, Minn., 487 N.W.2d
857 (Minn. 1992); Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97, 399 (Minn. 1990) (holding
that the Minnesota Constitution required it to apply the "strict scrutiny" standard, rather than
the lesser Smith standard, and stating that "[t]o infringe upon religious freedoms which this state
has traditionally revered, the state must demonstrate that public safety cannot be achieved
through reasonable alternative means"); Minnesota v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (Minn. 1990)
(holding that a landlord's right to exercise his religion under the Freedom of Conscience Provi-
sion of the Minnesota Constitution outweighed the state's interest and concluding that the state
failed to satisfy the "strict scrutiny" standard); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 852 (Vt. 1994) (con-
cluding that the state constitution required the strict scrutiny standard); State v. DeLaBruere,
577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990); Muns v. Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (Wash. 1997) (applying the strict
scrutiny analysis and stating that "[a] facially neutral, even-handedly enforced statute that does
not directly burden free exercise may, nonetheless, violate [the relevant constitutional provision]
if it indirectly burdens the exercise of religion"); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of
Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 224, 226-27, 840 P.2d 174, 186-87 (1992) (en banc) (noting that the
state constitution provides greater protection and uses language "stronger than the federal con-
stitution" and stated that "[s]tate action is constitutional under the free exercise clause of article
1 if the action results in no infringement of a citizen's right or if a compelling state interest
justifies any burden on the free exercise of religion .... The State also must demonstrate that
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courts have explicitly refused to follow the Supreme Court's opinion
in Smith, basing their decisions on independent grounds provided
under their state constitutions.501 Thus, in applying the "strict scru-
tiny" standard, some state courts have interpreted their constitutional
provisions to provide greater protection to religious exercise than the
federal constitution. 502 Other constitutions may be amended to pro-
vide this heightened level of protection.50 3
In still other states, legislation provides a heightened level of pro-
tection to religious liberty. Two states passed religious freedom legis-
lation after the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.5°4 Some
legislatures, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in City of
Boerne have considered and enacted statutes that would provide
greater protections to religious freedom than is afforded under the
federal constitution and laws.50 5
the means chosen to achieve its compelling interest are necessary and the least restrictive avail-
able") (citations omitted); Wisconsin v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 241(Wis. 1996) (stating that,
independent from the interpretation of the First Amendment, "the guarantees of our state con-
stitution will best be furthered through continued use of the compelling [state] interest/least
restrictive alternative analysis of free conscience claims").
501. See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Minn. 1990) (declining to rest its
opinion on the Smith opinion because the Minnesota Constitution provided an adequate, in-
dependent state constitutional basis upon which to decide); First Covenant Church of Seattle v.
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (1992) (en banc) (stating that it would "eschew the 'uncer-
tainty' of Smith II"); Wisconsin v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Wis. 1996) (emphasizing that its
holding was "firmly grounded on the Wisconsin Constitution alone").
502. See, e.g., Minnesota v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990) (stating that the Minnesota
Constitution "grants far more protection of religious freedom than the broad language of the
United States Constitution"); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d
203, 224, 840 P.2d 174, 186 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (stating that "[tjhe language of our state
constitution is significantly different and stronger than the federal constitution"). "The First
Amendment limits government action that 'prohibits' free exercise. Our state provision 'abso-
lutely' protects freedom of worship and bars conduct that merely 'disturbs' another on the basis
of religion." Id.
503. See ALA. CONST. prop. amend. (Act 98-409).
504. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (1997) (prohibiting the state and any of its political
subdivisions from placing a burden on the free exercise of religion unless the application of the
burden (1) promotes a compelling governmental intestest, and (2) is the least restrictive means
of promoting that interest); R.I. G N. LAws § 42-80.1-1 et seq. (1997) (requiring that any restric-
tion governmental authority places upon the free exercise of religion be a rule of general appli-
cability, not intentionally discriminate against religion or among religions, promote a compelling
governmental interest, and be the least restrictive means of promoting that interest).
505. See, e.g., H.B. 2370, 90th Gen. Assem., 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1998) (prohibiting the
government from substantially burden the free exercise of religion, even if the burden results
from a law of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the burden pro-
motes a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of promoting that
interest); FLA. STAT. ch. 761.01-.03 (1997) (applying strict scrutiny when state government sub-
stantially burdens the free exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability).
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b. Limited Protection for Religious Freedom
In some states, the protection of religious freedom afforded by strict
scrutiny analysis has been rejected, and instead only a reduced level of
protection is available. For instance, New Jersey state courts have re-
peatedly held that the state constitution's religion clauses provide the
same level of protection as those afforded by the First Amendment to
the Constitution.5 6 In Oregon, the state supreme court has inter-
preted the free exercise provisions of its constitution and determined,
independent of the federal First Amendment jurisprudence, that a
heightened level of protection for religious freedom is not required.50 7
Thus, in these states, neutral laws of general applicability that have an
incidental burden on religion would not violate the free exercise pro-
visions of their state constitutions.
c. Undefined Protection for Religious Freedom
In most states, the level of protection afforded under state constitu-
tional law has not been clearly defined. This uncertainty stems, at
least in part, from the fact that state courts relied on the pre-Smith
First Amendment jurisprudence when interpreting state constitutional
provisions regarding free exercise, often intertwining the state and
federal analyses.5 08 While in some states the courts have not specifi-
cally articulated the standard required by the state constitution,
the courts will likely apply a heightened standard such as the strict
506. See, e.g., South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Theresa of the Infant Jesus
Church Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997); Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n
of United Methodist Church, 370 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1977) (holding that the letter and spirit of the
state's constitutional provisions have substantially the same purpose, intent, and effect as the
provisions under the First Amendment); Bethany Baptist Church v. Deptford Township, 542
A.2d 505 (N.J. Ct. App. 1988) (applying strict scrutiny analysis to state free exercise claim in a
pre-Smith case).
507. See, e.g., Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351, 361 (Or. 1995) ("A law
that is neutral toward religion or nonreligion as such, that is neutral among religions, and that is
part of a general regulatory scheme having no purpose to control or interfere with rights of
conscience or with religious opinions does not violate the guarantees of religious freedom in
Article I, sections 2 and 3."); Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 448-49 (Or. 1986) (up-
holding a general regulatory scheme that was "completely neutral toward religious motiviations
for misconduct" even though it incidentally burdened the free exercise of religion), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
508. See, e.g., Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind.
1978) (citing both state and federal constitutions but relying solely on the U.S. Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence); North Dakota v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220, 228-29 (N.D.
1982) (stating that "when [the] constitutional provision was adopted by the state of North Da-
kota upon being granted statehood, it was tacitly approved and is in harmony with the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983).
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scrutiny standard.50 9 In other states, the courts will likely apply a
lower standard. 510 In many states, it is difficult to anticipate the level
of protection likely to be afforded under the state constitution.511
For instance, in California, legal precedents support the applica-
tion of both the heightened standard 512 and the reduced stand-
ard, 513 and thus, the standard remains to be determined. 514
509. See, e.g., Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 953 (Idaho 1993) (stating that "[A]rt. 1, § 4
of the Idaho Constitition is an even greater guardian of religious liberty" than the First Amend-
ment); Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 66 (Me. 1992) (applying the strict scrutiny test
but stating that "[w]e have no reason in this case to decide whether in applying the Maine Free
Exercise Clause will change course to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Smith"); Blount v.
Dept. of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988) (stating that "the full range of
protection afforded . . . by the Maine Constitution is also available under the United States
Constitution"); Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Falls, Billings, 728 P.2d 794, 797 (Mont. 1986) (rely-
ing on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and stating that "only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exer-
cise of religion" and that "[w]e use that standard as our guide").
510. See, e.g., Delcarpi v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 865 F. Supp. 350, 362 (E.D. La. 1994)
(stating that "under Louisiana jurisprudence, judicial determination of a claim brought pursuant
to the parallel sections of the federal constitution is applicable to Article 1, sections 7 and 8 of
the state constitution"), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995); Louisiana v.
Franzone, 384 So. 2d 409, 411 (La. 1980) ("we are satisfied that our state constitution's guarantee
of freedom of expression and freedom of the press was designed to serve the same purpose and
provides at least coextensive protection afforded under the First Amendment"); Petition of Ro-
land Spencer Smith, 652 A.2d 154 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a doctor could not avoid, on free
exercise grounds, compliance with neutrally applied state licensing requirements, but not stating
a standard of review); Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 648 (S.C. 1972) (stating that language of
First Amendment and language of Article I, section 2 of the state constitution are, "for all in-
tents and purposes, the same"), affd, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Rock Hill v. Henry, 135 S.E.2d 718
(S.C. 1963) (stating that the same rights protected by the First Amendment are fully protected by
the state constitution), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); South Carolina Dept. of
Social Servs. v. Father & Mother, 366 S.E.2d 40, 42 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that guarantees
of free exercise of religion in federal constitution and state constitution "have been treated as
coextensive").
511. Compare South Dakota v. Cosgrove, 439 N.W.2d 119, 121 (S.D.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
846 (1989) (stating, in a case raising federal and state constitutional claims, that "[t]he important
constitution underpinnings of this issue require that we apply the strict scrutiny standard to our
review") with South Dakota v. Arnold, 379 N.W.2d 322 (S.D.) (stating, in a case only federal free
exercise claim, that "[I]aws advancing legitimate and significant governmental interests are not
invalid for interfering with the free exercise of religion merely because they have some inciden-
tal detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religious views") (citing Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)), and IN RE Northwestern Lutheran Academy, 290 N.W.2d 845, 850
(S.D.) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld governmental regulations
concerning important governemntal interests, even though such programs may have an inciden-
tal effect upon the free exercise of religion) (citing Braunfeld).
512. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) (applying strict scrutiny
analysis to claim federal and state free exercise claim); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing
Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "the California Supreme Court
has indeed specifically adopted and employed the pre-Smith federal balancing test and compel-
ling state interest analysis as a matter of state constitutional law").
513. See, e.g, Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 171 P.2d 8, 15 (Cal. 1946) ("There can be no
question, therefore, that a person is free to hold whatever belief his conscience dictates, but
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d. State Standards Applied to Mandatory Reporting Requirements
The level of protection that a particular jurisdiction affords to the
free exercise of religion can make a significant difference in
mandatory reporting cases. If strict scrutiny analysis applies, any sig-
nificant burden on free exercise must promote a compelling govern-
ment interest and the means chosen must be the least restrictive
alternative. However, if a reduced level of analysis applies, then inci-
dental burdens on the free exercise of religion are permissible as long
as the law is a neutral law of general applicability.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the modern regulatory state, the law intersects with religious life
in significant ways, including the statutory provisions requiring clergy
to report certain instances of abuse. These reporting requirements
grow out of important public policy concerns regarding valuable, yet
vulnerable, segments of the United States population. In the case of
elder abuse, these public policy concerns involve a large and growing
segment of the population, with members who are subject to various
forms of mistreatment that often evade detection.
Failure to report elder abuse risks continued injury to aged persons
and legal liabilities for clergy. Imposing such a duty, however, creates
complex constitutional and legal issues. Clergy must understand the
nature and scope of the obligations placed on them and those working
under their supervision. In carefully considering the manner in which
to fulfill these obligations, clergy will need to assess a multitude of
interconnected issues, such as religious tradition, the instruction of
professional/ministerial ethics, the impact of reporting or failing to re-
port upon the victim, the religious community, and the local commu-
nity, the potential of criminal and/or civil liability, and the available
protections under the law. Having carefully balanced these competing
interests, the clergyperson will be in a position to determine whether
it is in fact a time to keep silent or a time to 'speak.
when he translates his belief into action he may be required to conform to reasonable regula-
tions which are applicable to all persons and are designed to accomplish a permissible
objective.").
514. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm., 913 P.2d 909 (Cal 1996).
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